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Abstract
We investigate the role that self-control problems — modeled as time-inconsistent,
present-biased preferences — and a person’s awareness of those problems might play in
leading people to develop and maintain harmful addictions. Present-biased preferences
create a tendency to over-consume addictive products, and awareness of future self-
control problems can mitigate or exacerbate this over-consumption, depending on the
environment. Our central concern is the welfare consequences of this over-consumption.
Our analysis suggests that for realistic environments self-control problems are a plau-
sible source of severely harmful addictions only in conjunction with some unawareness
of future self-control problems.
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Researchers from a variety of …elds have investigated the consumption of addictive products,
such as cigarettes, alcohol, and heroin, in an attempt to understand why people develop and
maintain seemingly destructive addictions. Recently, economists such as Becker and Murphy (1988)
have studied rational-choice models of addiction. These models make the realistic assumption that
people are forward-looking and take into account how current consumption of addictive products
will a¤ect their future tastes. But since these models also make the less realistic assumption that
people are 100% rational, they ap r i o r irule out a variety of explanations for addictive behavior
that many observers consider important. Most non-economists — and we suspect many economists
as well — do not view the rationality of addiction to be su¢ciently manifest to think that we should
not even consider possible irrationalities.
There are, of course, a tremendous variety of irrationalities that might be relevant to harmful
addictions. Indeed, in hearing from friends, colleagues, fellow researchers, and referees, we have
been struck by how many di¤erent explanations are pro¤ered. It seems certain that many factors
contribute to harmful addictions. However, before we can judge which factors are most important,
and how di¤erent factors interact, we must …rst understand the implications of speci…c types
of irrationalities. In this paper, we investigate the role that one psychologically well-established
departure from 100% rationality — self-control problems caused by a time-inconsistent preference
for immediate grati…cation — might play in harmful addictions. We analyze how such self-control
problems a¤ect addictive behavior, with a primary concern for welfare consequences. In particular
we investigate when and how self-control problems might cause severely harmful addictions.
In Section 2, we introduce a model of addiction in which a person decides each period whether to
“hit” or “refrain”. This binary-choice model is more tractable than previous models of addiction,
while still incorporating the two crucial characteristics of harmful addictive products found in these
previous models. First, harmful addictive products involve negative internalities: The more of the
product a person has consumed in the past, the lower is his overall well-being now. Second, they
involve habit formation: The more of the product a person has consumed in the past, the more he
desires that product now. The combination of negative internalities and habit formation creates
the trap of addiction: As a person consumes more and more of an addictive product, he gets less
and less pleasure from its consumption, yet he may continue to consume the product because
1refraining becomes more and more painful.1
We assume people have self-control problems caused by time-inconsistent present-biased prefer-
ences, whereby they pursue immediate grati…cation in ways that do not correspond to their long-run
well-being. We apply a simple model of such preferences that was originally proposed by Phelps and
Pollak (1968) in the context of intergenerational altruism, and …rst used by Laibson (1994,1997) to
capture self-control problems within an individual (with the label “quasi-hyperbolic discounting”).
As emphasized by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), the implications of such self-control problems
depend on a person’s awareness of his own future self-control problems. To examine the role of
awareness for addiction, we consider two extreme assumptions about such awareness: Sophisticates
are fully aware of their future self-control problems, and naifs are fully unaware of their future
self-control problems. We also analyze people with standard, time-consistent preferences, whom
we refer to as TCs. In our model, the behavior of TCs represents how sophisticates and naifs
would like to behave from a prior perspective. Hence, by systematically comparing sophisticates
and naifs to TCs, we can delineate how predictions depend both on present-biased preferences per
se and on assumptions about a person’s awareness of these preferences. Moreover, a comparison
of the utility of sophisticates and naifs to the utility of TCs reveals the harm caused by self-control
problems.2
In Section 3, we present an example that illustrates our most basic results. The decision whether
to consume an addictive product boils down to whether the current desire to consume outweighs
the future cost of this consumption. Hence, a preference for immediate grati…cation makes a person
1 We follow Becker and Murphy (1988) in interpreting an “addictive” good as a good that is habit-
forming; habit formation is transparently a key component of substances such as tobacco, alcohol,
heroin, and cocaine. Some theoretical models study alternative interpretations of addictiveness
that de-emphasize the role of habit formation. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) de…ne a good to be
addictive if past consumption makes a person less prone to choose now what he would have earlier
chosen had he had the opportunity to commit. Bernheim and Rangel (2002) de…ne an addictive
good such that, if the good has been consumed in the past, then neutral cues can trigger a “hot
state” that leads the person to consume the good again even if doing so is not in his best interest.
2 O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) analyze sophisticates and naifs in a simpli…ed version of the
model studied here. Gruber and Koszegi (2001,2002) study a model of self-control problems and
addiction that is quite similar to our model here; they use this model to investigate optimal
cigarette taxation designed to counteract over-consumption due to self-control problems. For other
papers on self-control problems and addiction, see Caillaud, Cohen, and Jullien (1999), who use a
di¤erent framework to show that if people follow “self-restrained strategies” they might consume
in moderation, and Carrillo (1999), who shows that if there is rational uncertainty about negative
internalities for addictive products, then sophisticates may abstain so as to avoid learning that
the internalities are su¢ciently small to justify continued consumption. All these papers, except
O’Donoghue and Rabin’s, assume that consumption is a continuous choice, and for simplicity limit
attention to stationary environments. See also Elster (1999).
2more prone to consume. We show that, indeed, naifs are always more likely to hit than TCs. We
next show that awareness can mitigate or exacerbate this over-consumption, so that sophisticates
can be more or less prone to hit than naifs. This ambiguity arises because there are two ways in
which awareness can in‡uence current behavior. First, sophisticates are pessimistic about their
future behavior, and believe in general that they will hit more often in the future than naifs think
they will. The habit-forming property of addictive goods implies that this pessimism e¤ect tends
to exacerbate over-consumption due to present-biased preferences. But the pessimism e¤ect can
be counteracted by an incentive e¤ect: Because sophisticates are worried about improper future
over-consumption, they may refrain now in an attempt to induce themselves to resist temptation
in the future.
In Section 4, we consider a stationary model of addiction that assumes a person’s desire to
consume the product depends on past consumption but is otherwise constant over time.3 In this
environment, sophisticates are more likely than naifs to develop a harmful addiction, but are
also more likely than naifs to quit an established addiction. These results re‡ect the interplay
between the pessimism and incentive e¤ects in the stationary environment, and in particular how
the incentive e¤ect is stronger the more addicted a person is. We then study when self-control
problems might cause severe harm in stationary environments. Sophisticates can su¤er severe
harm when they become addicted despite strongly preferring non-addiction, due to a feeling of
inevitability: A sophisticate might pessimistically (but realistically) believe that he’ll eventually
get addicted in the future no matter what he does today, and this belief can lead him to conclude
that he might as well start consuming today. Naifs’ over-optimistic beliefs help them avoid this
source of harm. But if, for some reason, they become addicted, naifs can su¤er severe harm when
they procrastinate in quitting. Even when quitting is well worth it, if a naif prefers quitting in the
near future rather than now, he will repeatedly delay quitting under the naive belief that he will
quit soon.
In Section 5, we consider a more realistic “youthful” model in which for any given addiction level
the temptation to hit is larger earlier in life than later in life. This model demonstrates how the
stationarity assumption maintained in Section 4 can yield misleading predictions. In the stationary
model, sophisticated self-control problems are problematic when a person feels that addiction is
inevitable. But under the reasonable assumption that a person eventually matures to a point
where he would have no desire to consume if he were unaddicted, sophisticates will not feel that
addiction is inevitable, and hence are less prone to harmful addictions. In the stationary model,
3 Stationarity is assumed in all rational-addiction models with which we are familiar, and also in
Caillaud, Cohen, and Jullien (1999), Carrillo (1999), and Gruber and Koszegi (2001,2002).
3naive self-control problems are problematic when they cause a person to procrastinate quitting
an established addiction. In the youthful model, large initial temptations provide an unfortunate
catalyst by which naifs can su¤er severe harm: Naifs may become addicted in their youth under
the naive belief that they will quit once the addictive behavior becomes less enticing, but then in
fact never quit due to procrastination.
We also use the youthful model to explore the role of temporary temptations in developing
harmful addictions. While Becker and Murphy (1988) argue it can be optimal for a person to
maintain a severely harmful addiction, their steady-state model provides no formal analysis of
why the person would choose to develop this harmful addiction in the …rst place. In their informal
discussion, Becker and Murphy suggest events such as youth, divorce, and the death of a loved
one as possible sources of harmful addictions. We directly investigate this hypothesis, and show
that while such events can lead to addiction by all three types, such an addiction can be severely
harmful only for naifs.
Our analysis in Sections 4 and 5 implicitly assumes that prices are …xed and constant. In Section
6, we explore the e¤ects of price on consumption. Although consumption is a discrete choice in our
model, and therefore our analysis of price comparative statics is necessarily crude, we are able to
capture some important intuitions for TCs and naifs.4 While the qualitative e¤ects of price changes
are the same for TCs and naifs, our model predicts di¤erent quantitative e¤ects. In particular,
because naifs underestimate their own future consumption, the e¤ects of future prices on current
consumption are much smaller for naifs than for TCs. This intuition might provide an explanation
for the puzzle in the empirical literature on rational addiction that temporary price changes and
permanent price changes have similar e¤ects on consumption. Under the maintained hypothesis
of time consistency, this empirical result implies that people have absurd discount rates. But our
model suggests that this empirical result might be consistent with a reasonable long-term discount
rate combined with a small self-control problem about which the person is naive.
Finally, we conclude in Section 7 with a discussion of some general lessons to take away from our
analysis, and why we feel our model of addiction and present-biased preferences is an improvement
on rational-choice models of addiction.
4 Gruber and Koszegi’s (2001, 2002) continuous-choice model permits a much better analysis of
price e¤ects, with the caveat that they conduct a steady-state analysis in a stationary model with
speci…c functional forms. They use this model to analyze optimal taxation of addictive goods.
42. The Model
The crucial feature of addictive products is that past consumption a¤ects current well-being.
Becker and Murphy (1988) provide a model of instantaneous utility functions that captures this
feature.5 In this paper, we introduce a simpli…ed version of their model: Rather than assuming
consumption is a continuous choice, we model consumption as a binary choice. Our model main-
tains the key features of Becker and Murphy’s model, and our main conclusions are driven by these
features. But our less realistic binary-choice model is signi…cantly more tractable, allowing us to
study optimal behavior (rather than merely steady-state behavior, as do Becker and Murphy) and
permitting analysis of a richer array of environments. Most importantly, we are able to directly
analyze the role of non-stationarities in the temptation to consume, which seem likely to play an
important role in why people develop harmful addictions.
We consider a discrete-time model with periods 1;:::;T, where we consider both T<1 and
T = 1. Each period, a person can either take a “hit”, in which case his consumption at =1 ,o r
“refrain”, in which case at =0 . In a given period, the person decides only whether to hit now, and
has no way to commit to future behavior. For most of our analysis, we assume that the addictive
product is free, which helps highlight the fact that people may avoid addictive products not because
of their purchase price per se, but rather because of their detrimental long-run consequences. We
explore the role of prices for consumption in Section 6.
Let kt be the person’s addiction level in period t, which captures all e¤ects of past consumption
for period-t instantaneous utility. We assume kt evolves according to the equation kt = °kt¡1+at¡1;
where ° 2 [0;1) is a parameter indicating the rate at which an addiction decays. When ° =0 ,
refraining for a single period gets the person completely unaddicted. For ° close to 1, refraining
reduces the person’s addiction level very little. The appropriate ° depends on both the nature of
the addictive product being examined, as well as on the time scale of each “period”, be it a day, a
year, or an epoch of one’s life. This formulation implies a maximum addiction level: If the person
hits every period, his addiction level converges to kmax ´
P1
t=1 °t¡1 = 1
1¡°.6
We assume the person’s instantaneous utility function in period t is
ut(at;k t) ´
½
xt + f(kt) if at =1
yt + g(kt) if at =0 .
5 For earlier work on habit formation using a similar formulation, see Pollak (1970) and Ryder
and Heal (1973).
6 The parameter ° corresponds to (1 ¡ ±) in Becker and Murphy (1988). This formulation is
p o t e n t i a l l yr e s t r i c t i v ei nt h a ti tc o m b i n e si n t oas i n g l ep a r a m e t e rt h er a t ea tw h i c hap e r s o nbe c o m e s
addicted when hitting and the rate at which a person becomes unaddicted when refraining.
5Without loss of generality, we set f(0) = g(0) = 0, and we often drop the subscript t from kt
and at when there is no danger of confusion. This formulation allows for the instantaneous utility
function to be constant across time or to vary.
The temptation to hit in period t is ht(k) ´ ut(1;k)¡ut(0;k)=[ xt ¡ yt]+[f(k) ¡ g(k)],w h i c h
is the person’s instantaneous marginal utility from hitting. The temptation to hit consists of two
components: an exogenous component xt ¡ yt ´ ¹ xt that is independent of past consumption, and
an endogenous component f(k) ¡ g(k) that depends on past consumption.
Our analysis hinges on two characteristics of addictive products. First, they generate negative
internalities: The more the person has consumed in the past, the smaller is his current well-being.
Negative internalities include health, job, and personal problems caused by past consumption.
Negative internalities might also include “tolerance” — the loss in enjoyment of an addictive
substance due to regular consumption.7 Formally:
De…nition 1. A product has negative internalities if for all k, f0(k) < 0 and g0(k) < 0.
In addition to generating negative internalities, addictive products are habit-forming: The more
of the product the person has consumed in the past, the more he will be tempted to consume now.8
Formally:
De…nition 2. A product is habit-forming if for all k, h0
t(k)=f0(k) ¡ g0(k) > 0.
Although negative internalities are incorporated into both f and g, we often refer to f(k) · 0
as an internality cost, and g(k) ¡f(k) · 0 as a withdrawal cost due to habit formation. A person
incurs the internality cost f(k) no matter what he does in period t; he incurs in addition the
withdrawal cost g(k) ¡ f(k) only if he refrains in period t. Hence, habit formation implies that
the cost of past consumption is larger when the person refrains as opposed to hit. This feature of
addictive products will play an important role in our analysis.
Besides assuming negative internalities and habit formation, we assume that f and g are weakly
7 We adopt the term “internalities” from Herrnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec, and Vaughn (1993),
who de…ne an internality to be a “within-person externality”. While some products generate
positive internalities, harmful addictive products are generally thought to generate negative inter-
nalities, and that is the case we focus on in this paper.
8 Internalities and habit formation are not inherently tied together; eating potato chips may
generate negative internalities, but is not necessarily habit-forming.
6convex in k: f00(k) ¸ 0 and g00(k) ¸ 0.9 The more addicted the person becomes, the less a given
increase in k hurts his instantaneous utility, and therefore the less harm hitting does to future




xt ¡ ½k if a =1
yt ¡ (½ + ¾)k if a =0 .
In this formulation, the parameter ½>0 represents the internality cost, and the parameter ¾>0
represents the withdrawal cost.
The trade-o¤ between the temptation to hit and its future costs is the crux of the choice to
become addicted. How people weigh this trade-o¤ depends on their intertemporal preferences. The
standard economics model assumes that intertemporal preferences are time-consistent:Ap e r s o n ’ s
relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later date is the same no matter when
she is asked. But there is a mass of evidence that intertemporal preferences take on a speci…c
form of time inconsistency: A person’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a
l a t e rd a t eg e t ss t r o n g e ra st h ee a r l i e rd a t eg e t sc l o s e r . 10 In other words, people have self-control
problems caused by a tendency to pursue immediate grati…cation in a way that their “long-run
s e l v e s ”d on o ta p p r e c i a t e .
In this paper, we apply a simple form of such present-biased preferences, using a model originally
developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the context of intergenerational altruism, and …rst used
by Laibson (1994,1997) to capture self-control problems within an individual.11 Let ut be the
instantaneous utility the person gets in period t. Then his intertemporal preferences from the
perspective of time t can be represented by the following intertemporal utility function:
9 Most results hold even if f and g are a little concave, and some do not rely at all on them being
convex. Note that we make no assumption about whether the endogenous temptation f(k)¡g(k)
is convex or concave.
10 See, for instance, Ainslie (1975, 1991, 1992), Ainslie and Haslam (1992a, 1992b), Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992), Thaler (1991), Thaler and Loewenstein (1992), and, for a recent overview,
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002). While the rubric of “hyperbolic discounting” is
often used to describe such preferences, we use the term “present-biased preferences” to re‡ect the
qualitative feature of the time inconsistency that is more general, and more generally supported
by empirical evidence, than the speci…c hyperbolic functional form.
11 This model has since been used by numerous authors, including Laibson (1998), Laibson,
Repetto, and Tobacman (1998), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b,1 9 9 9 c, 2001), Fischer
(1999), Carrillo (1999), Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and
Weinberg (2001), Harris and Laibson (2001), Gruber and Koszegi (2001,2002), and Benabou and
Tirole (forthcoming).




The parameter ± represents “time-consistent” discounting, while the parameter ¯ represents the
“present bias”. For ¯ =1these preferences reduce to (the discrete version of) exponential discount-
ing, whereas for ¯<1 these preferences parsimoniously capture the time-inconsistent preference
for immediate grati…cation.
As emphasized by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), the implications of such self-control prob-
lems depend on a person’s awareness of his own future self-control problems. To analyze the role of
awareness of future self-control problems, we consider two types of people representing extreme as-
sumptions about such awareness: Sophisticates are fully aware of their future self-control problems;
and naifs are fully unaware of their future self-control problems.12 While there is relatively little
evidence on whether people are sophisticated vs. naive, two recent studies — one by Ariely and
Wertenbroch (forthcoming) that examines procrastination, and one by DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2001) that examines health-club memberships and usage — demonstrate that people exhibit some
degree of naivete. Especially given the common restriction of researchers studying present-biased
preferences to the case of sophistication, an important goal in this paper is to understand not only
the ways that present bias a¤ects addictive behavior, but also how the degree of sophistication
matters for such behavior. Indeed, our analysis will demonstrate that, if (some) people are in fact
naive, models that assume full sophistication may yield very misleading behavioral and welfare
conclusions.13
We also analyze people with standard, time-consistent preferences (who have ¯ =1 ), whom we
refer to as TCs.G i v e no u r¯;± formulation above, the behavior of TCs represents how sophisticates
and naifs would like to behave if asked from some prior perspective (before period 1). Hence,
by systematically comparing sophisticates and naifs to TCs, we can delineate how predictions
depend both on present-biased preferences per se and on assumptions about foresight. Moreover,
a comparison of the utility of sophisticates and naifs to the utility of TCs reveals the harm caused
12 These assumptions (and the labels) were originally laid out by Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968).
Note that we use this very narrow de…nition of “naivete” throughout our paper, despite the fact
that other errors — some of which we discuss in the conclusion — might equally well be dubbed
naivete.
13 Most papers studying time-inconsistent preferences assume sophistication (e.g., Laibson (1994,
1997, 1998), Harris and Laibson (2001), Fischer (1999), Carrillo (1999), Carrillo and Mariotti
(2000), Gruber and Koszegi (2001,2002), Benabou and Tirole (forthcoming)). Akerlof (1991) and
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b,1 9 9 9 c), also consider naive beliefs. O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2001) formalize and analyze a case of partial naivete in between these two extremes.
8by self-control problems.
To analyze the behavior of these three types of people, we assume people follow perception-
perfect strategies (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a). In words, a person chooses to hit in period t
if and only if hitting in period t is optimal given his period-t preferences and his period-t beliefs
about how he will behave in the future. In order to formally describe both behavior and beliefs,
we de…ne a strategy as a function ® :[ 0 ;k max] £f 1;2;:::;Tg!f 0;1g, where strategy ® prescribes
action ®(k;t) in period t when the addiction level is k.
De…ne Ut(kt;®) to be the person’s period-t long-run utility from following strategy ® given
period-t addiction level kt. “Long-run utility” represents the person’s intertemporal preferences
from a prior perspective that is temporally removed from the current desire for immediate grat-
i…cation — that is, the person’s intertemporal preferences when ¯ =1 . A useful way to write






[xt + f(kt)] + ±Ut+1 (°kt +1 ;®) if ®(kt;t)=1
[yt + g(kt)] + ±Ut+1 (°kt;®) if ®(kt;t)=0 .
C o n s i d e rap e r s o ni np e r i o dt whose current addiction level is k, and suppose this person
perceives that he will follow strategy ®p beginning in period t+1. This person believes that if he hits
this period then his intertemporal utility beginning next period will be Ut+1(°k+1 ;® p),a n dt h a t
if he refrains this period then his intertemporal utility beginning next period will be Ut+1(°k;®p).
Hence, he perceives the (undiscounted) future cost from hitting to be Ut+1(°k;®p)¡Ut+1(°k+1;® p).
H ew o u l dt h e nh i ti np e r i o dt if and only if the current temptation to hit ht(k) is larger than the
(discounted) future cost from hitting. For simplicity, we assume a person hits when indi¤erent.
Given this framework, we can formally de…ne perception-perfect strategies for the three types of
people. Because TCs correctly predict their future behavior, and because TCs discount the future
cost of hitting by ±, we de…ne perception-perfect strategies for TCs as:
De…nition 3. A perception-perfect strategy for TCs is a strategy ®tc that satis…es for all









At any point in time, naifs believe they will behave like TCs beginning next period — that is,
in any period naifs perceive that they will follow strategy ®tc beginning next period. Because naifs
9discount the future cost from hitting by ¯±, we de…ne perception-perfect strategies for naifs as:
De…nition 4. A perception-perfect strategy for naifs is a strategy ®n that satis…es for all









Sophisticates, like TCs, predict exactly how they will behave in the future. But sophisticates,
like naifs, discount the future cost from hitting by ¯±. Hence, we de…ne perception-perfect strategies
for sophisticates as:
De…nition 5. A perception-perfect strategy for sophisticates is a strategy ®s that satis…es
for all k ¸ 0 and for all t, ®s(k;t)=1if and only if ht(k) ¸ ¯±[Ut+1 (°k;®s) ¡ Ut+1 (°k+1 ;® s)].
For TCs and naifs, this solution concept is equivalent to them formulating an optimal consump-
tion path in each period and choosing the current action that is part of that consumption path.14
TCs always stick to the consumption path chosen in the …rst period, whereas naifs often revise their
chosen consumption paths as their preferences change from period to period. For sophisticates, in
contrast, this solution concept implies that they are in a sense playing a game against their future
selves. Hence, their behavior partly re‡ects “strategic” reactions to bad behavior by future selves
that they cannot directly control, and partly re‡ects attempts to induce good behavior from future
selves.15
Finally, we note that, in order to lay bare the implications of self-control problems for addiction,
we assume that people are otherwise fully rational — and, for instance, correctly predict how
current consumption a¤ects future instantaneous utility functions. We brie‡y discuss other errors
in the conclusion.
14 We assume throughout that an optimal consumption path exists.
15 Conspicuously absent from our model is the use of external commitment devices. Alcoholics
sophisticated about their self-control problems may, for instance, choose to check themselves into
the Betty Ford Clinic. Note that the existence of external commitment devices would not a¤ect
the behavior of naifs (or TCs) since they believe they will behave themselves in the future and
therefore see no need for commitment devices.
103. An Example and Some Basic Results
In this section we work through an example that illustrates some important intuitions, and in
the process we derive some basic results that hold for any instantaneous utilities satisfying the
assumptions outlined in Section 2.
Example 1
Suppose T = 1 and ° =0 , which implies kt 2f 0;1g for all t —i ne a c hp e r i o dt h ep e r s o ni s
either “unhooked” or “hooked”. Suppose further that the person has a linear instantaneous utility
function with parameters ½ and ¾. Finally, suppose yt =0for all t and xt = xo for all t 2f 2;3;:::g.
How does an unhooked person behave in period 1 as a function of x1?
A person hits when the temptation to hit is larger than the perceived future cost of that hit. In
period 1, the temptation to hit for an unhooked person is x1. The future cost of hitting depends
on perceived future behavior. Suppose that optimal behavior beginning in period 2 is to refrain in
all future periods whether unhooked or hooked at that time.16 Because TCs (correctly) and naifs
(possibly incorrectly) believe that they will behave in this way, they both perceive that hitting will
lead to continuation utility U2(1;® tc)=¡(½+¾)+ ±
1¡±0 and that refraining will lead to continuation
utility U2(0;® tc)=0+ ±
1¡±0. Hence, they both perceive that hitting in period 1 will yield a future
cost of U2(0;® tc) ¡ U2(1;® tc)=½ + ¾.
Applying De…nitions 3 and 4, TCs hit in period 1 if and only if x1 ¸ ±(½ + ¾), and naifs hit in
period 1 if and only if x1 ¸ ¯±(½ + ¾). Hence, naifs are more prone to hit in period 1 than TCs,
re‡ecting that the direct implication of present-biased preferences is a tendency to over-consume
harmful addictive products. This outcome is a straightforward implication of the fact that TCs
and naifs perceive the same future implications of hitting, combined with the fact that naifs have a
greater taste for immediate grati…cation. Clearly this conclusion is quite general: Part 3 of Lemma
1 establishes that for any instantaneous utilities satisfying our assumptions in Section 2, in any
situation naifs are more likely to hit than TCs. As a preliminary step that will prove quite useful
in our later analysis, Lemma 1 also establishes that both TCs and naifs follow cuto¤ strategies
where in each period the person hits if and only if his addiction level is larger than some critical
level. This result is driven by the non-concavity of the instantaneous utility function with respect
to the addiction level k, which implies that the future cost of hitting is non-increasing in k.17
16 As our analysis in Section 4 will reveal, this holds when ¡(½ + ¾) > (xo ¡ ½)=(1 ¡ ±).
17 All proofs are in the Appendix.
11Lemma 1. For any instantaneous utilities and for any T:
(1) There is a unique perception-perfect strategy for TCs, ®tc, and for all t there exists ¹ ktc
t such
that ®tc(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ ¹ ktc
t ,
(2) There is a unique perception-perfect strategy for naifs, ®n, and for all t there exists ¹ kn
t such
that ®n(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ ¹ kn
t ,a n d
(3) ®tc(k;t) · ®n(k;t) for all k and t, or equivalently ¹ ktc
t ¸ ¹ kn
t for all t.
We next investigate how awareness of future self-control problems a¤ects this over-consumption.
In Example 1, naifs in period 1 optimistically believe they will behave themselves in the future —
and refrain forever after — whereas sophisticates correctly predict that they may misbehave. Let’s
…rst suppose that sophisticates will in fact hit forever after regardless of whether they enter period
2 unhooked or hooked.18 Because they correctly predict this future behavior, sophisticates perceive
that hitting will lead to continuation utility U2(1;® s)=( xo ¡½)+ ±
1¡±(xo ¡½) and that refraining
will lead to continuation utility U2(0;® s)=xo + ±
1¡±(xo ¡ ½). Hence, sophisticates perceive that
hitting in period 1 will yield a future cost of U2(0;® s) ¡ U2(1;® s)=½.
Applying De…nition 5, sophisticates hit in period 1 if and only if x1 ¸ ¯±½. Given our earlier
conclusion that naifs perceive the future cost of hitting to be ½ + ¾, and hence hit in period 1
if and only if x1 ¸ ¯±(½ + ¾), in this case sophisticates are more prone to hit in period 1 than
naifs. This outcome re‡ects the implications of pessimism in the realm of addiction: Because the
habit-forming property of addictive products implies that a current hit has a larger future cost the
more one expects to refrain in the future, pessimism about future behavior makes a person more
prone to succumb to the temptation to hit, and therefore tends to exacerbate over-consumption.
We refer to this logic as the pessimism e¤ect, and Lemma 2 establishes that this logic holds for
any instantaneous utilities satisfying our assumptions in Section 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose that for both kt+1 = °kt and kt+1 = °kt +1, strategy ® induces consumption
path (at+1;a t+2;:::;a T) and strategy ®0 induces consumption path (a0
t+1;a 0
t+2;:::;a0
T).I fa¿ ¸ a0
¿
for all ¿ ¸ t +1 ,t h e nUt+1(°kt;®) ¡ Ut+1(°kt +1 ;®) · Ut+1(°kt;® 0) ¡ Ut+1(°kt +1 ;® 0).
Lemma 2 states that if for both ® and ®0 the future consumption path is independent of current
consumption, and if ® involves unambiguously more future consumption than ®0, then a current
hit causes less future harm under ®. This result plays an important role in the implications of
sophistication. If future behavior does not depend on current behavior, so that the implications
18 As our later analysis will reveal, this holds when xo ¸ ¯±½.
12of sophistication derive solely from di¤erent perceptions of how much they will consume in the
future, naifs are less likely to consume than sophisticates.
There is more to sophistication than simple pessimism, however, because current behavior might
in‡uence future behavior. Let us again return to Example 1, but now suppose that sophisticates
will hit forever after if they are hooked in period 2 but will refrain forever after if they are unhooked
in period 2.19 Sophisticates now perceive that hitting will lead to continuation utility U2(1;® s)=
(xo ¡ ½)+ ±
1¡±(xo ¡ ½) and that refraining will lead to continuation utility U2(0;® s)=0+ ±
1¡±0.
Hence, they perceive that hitting in period 1 will yield a future cost of U2(0;® s)¡U2(1;® s)=
½¡xo
1¡± ,





. Given our earlier conclusion that naifs
h i ti np e r i o d1i fa n do n l yi fx1 ¸ ¯±(½+¾), and given our presumption that optimal behavior is to
refrain forever after even if hooked, which implies ¡(½+¾) >
xo¡½
1¡± ,w ec o n c l u d et h a ts o p h i s t i c a t e s
are less prone to hit in period 1 than naifs.
In Example 1, sophisticates might refrain in period 1 while naifs hit if sophisticates are refrain-
ing in an attempt to induce future restraint — or equivalently in an attempt to prevent future
misbehavior. We refer to this second e¤ect of sophistication as the incentive e¤ect: Because sophis-
ticates are worried about improper future over-consumption, they may refrain now in an attempt
to induce themselves to resist temptation in the future. In the realm of addiction, the incentive
e¤ect means that sophistication can mitigate over-consumption due to present-biased preferences.
Hence, there is a tension between the pessimism and incentive e¤ects that determines whether
sophisticates or naifs are more prone to consume an addictive product. In the next two sections,
we examine how this tension plays out in some di¤erent environments.20
4. Stationary Preferences
Preferences are stationary when a person’s instantaneous utility function ut(a;k) depends on
his current addiction level k but not on the speci…c period t. Formally:
Stationary Preferences:
For all t, ut(a;k) ´
½
xo + f(k) if a =1
yo + g(k) if a =0 .






20 The pessimism and incentive e¤ects are …rst discussed in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b). These
e¤ects represent a decomposition of the “sophistication e¤ect” identi…ed in O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999a).
13Stationary preferences mean, for instance, that the …rst hit of a cigarette or cocaine yields the
same pleasure to a 20-year old as it does to a 60-year old. While on both social and physiological
grounds we are skeptical of this assumption, most research on addiction assumes stationarity, and
one of our goals is to highlight its importance. Stationary preferences are also useful to clarify
some important intuitions.
Our analysis of stationary preferences assumes an in…nite horizon, in part for expositional ease,
and in part because this assumption is closer in spirit to rational-choice models of addiction. In
addition, we often analyze how a person behaves starting from an initial addiction level k1 > 0,
which can be naturally interpreted as re‡ecting the net e¤ects of unmodeled past consumption.
Indeed, our analysis here of the k1 > 0 case is a useful building block for our analysis in the next
section, where we look at a stationary model preceded by a youthful period of larger exogenous
temptations. Finally, many of our results in this section will be stated in terms of ¹ xo ´ xo ¡ yo.
Lemma 3 establishes that with stationary preferences and an in…nite horizon, the cuto¤ for TCs
and the cuto¤ for naifs are both stationary.
Lemma 3. Under stationary preferences and T = 1,t h e r ee x i s t s¹ ktc such that for all t, ®tc(k;t)=
1 if and only if k ¸ ¹ ktc; and there exists ¹ kn such that for all t, ®n(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ ¹ kn.
Intuitively, TCs and naifs choose optimal consumption paths, and with stationary preferences
and an in…nite horizon the optimal consumption paths are independent of the current period. An
immediate implication of Lemma 3 is that for any initial addiction level both TCs and naifs either
never hit or hit always.
For sophisticates, unlike for TCs and naifs, there can be multiple perception-perfect strategies
for an in…nite horizon. We restrict attention to perception-perfect strategies for the in…nite horizon
that correspond to the unique …nite-horizon perception-perfect strategy as the horizon becomes
long.21 Lemma 4 characterizes the behavior of sophisticates under this restriction:
21 Our formal results derive characteristics of the unique …nite-horizon perception-perfect strategy
that must hold far enough from the end of the game. For sophisticates, this restriction rules out
in…nite-horizon perception-perfect strategies where a person refrains because of a belief that hitting
will lead to bad continuation utility beyond the change in incentives, analogous to folk-theorem
type equilibria in in…nitely-repeated games. The reader should not be overly worried about this
restriction because it biases sophisticates towards “bad behavior” — it rules out strategies whereby
sophisticates behave themselves due to this mentality — and yet we shall conclude that in realistic
environments sophisticated self-control problems are not a plausible source of severe addictions.
For both TCs and naifs, the unique in…nite-horizon perception-perfect strategy corresponds to the
unique …nite-horizon perception-perfect strategy as the horizon becomes long.
14Lemma 4. Under stationary instantaneous utilities and T = 1:
(1) If ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H then ®s(k;t)=1for all k and t;a n d



















The value ¢H is the future cost from hitting for an unaddicted person who has the most
pessimistic beliefs possible: He believes he will hit forever ever after no matter what he does
now. Lemma 4 establishes that a crucial question for sophisticates is how they would behave
when unaddicted given such extremely pessimistic beliefs. Intuitively, if there is a …nite horizon, a
sophisticate facing exogenous temptation ¹ xo > 0 recognizes that he will hit in the …nal moments
of his life.22 Hence, if he refrains at all, it must be that there is some moment far enough from
the end of his life where he prefers to refrain despite pessimistically believing he will hit for the
remainder of his life, which holds if and only if ¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H. The condition ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H can be
interpreted as a kind of “inevitability condition”: If it holds, sophisticates perceive that addiction
is inevitable in the sense that no matter what they do today their future selves will hit forever
after. An immediate implication of Lemma 4 is that an unaddicted sophisticate either never hits
or hits always.
For TCs, the desired (and actual) behavior path is either hitting always or never hitting. For
a person with present-biased preferences, the desired behavior path is either never hitting (N),
hitting always (A), or hitting now and never again (1). Let kN;A(¯) denote the addiction level
such that a person prefers hitting always to never hitting if and only if k ¸ kN;A(¯),a n dl e tkN;1(¯)
denote the addiction level such that a person prefers hitting once to never hitting if and only if
k ¸ kN;1(¯). Lemma 5 uses these values to describe actual behavior for the three types.23
22 While the discussion in the text uses the assumption ¹ xo > 0 to avoid some technical details,
the formal results do not rely on this assumption, as ¹ xo < 0 merely implies we are in the case
¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H.
23 The proof of Lemma 5 provides equations de…ning kN;A(¯) and kN;1(¯). Because for TCs hitting
once is never desired, clearly kN;A(1) · kN;1(1).F o r¯<1, kN;A(¯) and kN;1(¯) are not rankable;
but hitting once can be desired only if kN;1(¯) <k N;A(¯).
15Lemma 5. Under stationary instantaneous utilities and T = 1, for all t:
(1) ®tc(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ kN;A(1);
(2) ®n(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ minfkN;A(¯);kN;1(¯)g;a n d
(3) If ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H,t h e n®s(k;t)=1for all k;i f¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H and °kN;1(¯)+1¸ kN;A(¯),t h e n
®s(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ kN;A(¯);a n di f¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H and °kN;1(¯)+1<k N;A(¯),t h e n
®s(k;t)=0if k<k N;1(¯) and ®s(k;t)=1if k ¸ kN;A(¯).
Part 1 characterizes the actual behavior of TCs. Because for TCs actual behavior is identical
to desired behavior, TCs hit if and only if they prefer hitting always to never hitting, which holds
if and only if their current addiction level k is larger than kN;A(1). Part 2 characterizes the actual
behavior of naifs. Because naifs attempt to follow their desired behavior path, they hit if and only
if they prefer either hitting always or hitting once to never hitting, which holds if and only if their
current addiction level k is larger than either kN;A(¯) or kN;1(¯).
Part 3 characterizes the actual behavior of sophisticates. If ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H then, as established by
Lemma 4, sophisticates hit no matter what. If ¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H, then sophisticates refrain whenever
their desired behavior is never hitting, which holds if k<minfkN;A(¯);kN;1(¯)g, and sophisticates
hit whenever hitting always is preferred to never hitting, which holds if k ¸ kN;A(¯). The remaining
question is how do sophisticates behave if k 2 [kN;1(¯);kN;A(¯)). In this case, sophisticates would
like to hit once, but if °kN;1(¯)+1¸ kN;A(¯) then a single hit would increase their addiction
level to the point where they would hit forever after. Hence, hitting once (or any …nite number) is
not feasible, and so sophisticates refrain for any k 2 [kN;1(¯);kN;A(¯)].I fi n s t e a d°kN;1(¯)+1<
kN;A(¯), there can be situations in which hitting for a …nite number of periods is feasible, in which
case sophisticates’ behavior can be quite complicated for k 2 [kN;1(¯);kN;A(¯)). In fact, because
of these complications sophisticates need not follow a stationary strategy or a cuto¤ strategy.
Lemma 5 permits a simple comparison of the behavior of TCs, naifs, and sophisticates, which
we present as Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. Under stationary instantaneous utilities and T = 1:
(1) If ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H,t h e n®tc(k;t) · ®n(k;t) · ®s(k;t) for all k and t;a n d
(2) If ¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H,t h e n®tc(k;t) · ®s(k;t) · ®n(k;t) for all k and t.
16In the stationary model, whether sophisticates or naifs are more likely to consume an addictive
product depends crucially on whether the inevitability condition ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H holds. This conclusion
re‡ects the interplay between the pessimism and incentive e¤ects in the stationary model. The
pessimism e¤ect is always at work in inducing sophisticates to consume more than naifs. The crucial
question therefore is under what conditions is the incentive e¤ect operative, leading sophisticates to
refrain in order to induce good behavior in the future. Refraining now can induce future restraint
only if persistent restraint puts the person in a situation where he would refrain even in the absence
of the incentive e¤ect. With stationary instantaneous utilities, such situations are possible if and
only if ¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H. Proposition 1 establishes that whenever ¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H, the incentive e¤ect is
operative and sophisticates refrain whenever naifs refrain.
Whereas Proposition 1 describes how the implications of sophistication depend on the inevitabil-
ity condition, Proposition 2 describes how the implications of sophistication depend on the initial
addiction level.
Proposition 2. Under stationary instantaneous utilities and T = 1, for any ¯, ±, °, f(¢),a n d
g(¢), there exists ¹ k 2 (0;kmax) such that
(1) If k1 · ¹ k, then for any ¹ xo where naifs hit always, sophisticates hit always; and
(2) If k1 ¸ ¹ k, then for any ¹ xo where naifs never hit, sophisticates never hit.
Proposition 2 establishes that for su¢ciently unaddicted people, sophisticates are more likely
to hit always than naifs, whereas for su¢ciently addicted people, naifs are more likely to hit
always than sophisticates. These results once more re‡ect the interplay between the pessimism
and incentive e¤ects. As discussed above, the incentive e¤ect can dominate the pessimism e¤ect
only if persistent restraint puts the person in a situation where he would refrain even in the
absence of the incentive e¤ect. In the stationary model, this can happen only if the person is
already somewhat addicted, in which case persistent restraint reduces the person’s addiction level
and thereby reduces the temptation to consume.
Part 1 of Proposition 2 implies sophisticates are more likely than naifs to develop an addiction,
which contradicts the common intuition that harmful addictions are caused by people naively
slipping into an unplanned addiction. While we shall in the end vindicate aspects of this intuition,
the direct e¤ect of over-optimism is to deter consumption, and therefore the sense in which people
naively get addicted is not straightforward. Part 2 of Proposition 2 implies naifs are less likely than
sophisticates to quit an established addiction, which, in contrast, accords well with the common
17intuition that people “procrastinate” quitting an addiction. Indeed, continuation of an addiction
that a person plans to withdraw from is psychologically and mathematically very similar to the
type of procrastination discussed in Akerlof (1991) and analyzed in detail in O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a).
It is useful at this point to consider an example:
Example 2: Stationary Linear Model
Suppose f(k)=¡½k and g(k)=¡(½ + ¾)k.
If k1 =0 , then: TCs hit always if and only if ¹ xo ¸
±½
1¡±°.










Sophisticates hit always if and only if ¹ xo ¸
¯±½
1¡±°.
If k1 = kmax, then: TCs hit always if and only if ¹ xo + ¾kmax ¸
±(½+¾)
1¡±° .
Naifs hit always if and only if ¹ xo + ¾kmax ¸
¯±(½+¾)
1¡±° .




and only if ¹ xo + ¾kmax ¸
¯±(½+¾)
1¡±° .
In Example 2, it is easy to see that unaddicted sophisticates are more likely to hit always than
unaddicted naifs, but addicted sophisticates are less likely to hit always than addicted naifs. But
more interesting is the fact that simple qualitative comparative statics do not di¤er across the three
types. For all three types, the likelihood of hitting always is increasing in the exogenous temptation
¹ xo, and decreasing in the degree of negative internalities ½ and in the patience parameters ¯ and
±. The inherent persistence of addiction ° decreases the likelihood of hitting always when initially
unaddicted and increases the likelihood of hitting always when initially addicted, and the degree of
habit formation ¾ increases the likelihood of hitting always when initially addicted.24 These results
illustrate the more general point that simple qualitative comparative-static predictions often cannot
distinguish the rational-choice model from our self-control model. Indeed, every comparative-static
prediction that we’ve seen given in support of the rational-addiction model is equally supportive
of our self-control model of addiction. We return to this point in Section 6 when we discuss the
implications of our model for price comparative statics.
We next turn our attention to the welfare implications of present-biased preferences in the
stationary model. There is clearly a popular concern that people are causing themselves severe
24 For an unaddicted person the degree of habit formation ¾ plays a role in the propensity to
hit only if the person plans to incur withdrawal costs. Because an unaddicted person would incur
withdrawal costs only if he planned to hit in the short term and then refrain, in the stationary model
¾ is relevant only for naifs. The behavior of sophisticates can be annoyingly non-monotonic in some
parameters; but recent work by Harris and Laibson (2001) suggests that such non-monotonicities
disappear as noise is introduced.
18harm when they develop and maintain harmful addictions. Because rational-choice models of
addiction ap r i o r iassume that people are behaving in their own best interests, they cannot address
this concern. Our model, in contrast, shows how present-biased preferences can be a source of over-
consumption. Even so, the question remains should we be worried about this over-consumption.
When do self-control problems cause severely harmful addictions, and when do they merely lead
to minor episodes of suboptimality?
To address this question in a principled way, we …rst de…ne a notion of “harm”. Recall from
Section 2 that a person’s long-run utility U1(k1;®) represents his intertemporal preferences (over
strategies ®) from a prior perspective that is temporally removed from the desire for immediate
grati…cation — e.g., his preferences if we asked him one week, or one month, or one year prior to
his …rst opportunity to hit. Also recall that the behavior of TCs represents how sophisticates and
naifs would like to behave — if asked from a prior perspective, ®tc is the desired behavior path for
both sophisticates and naifs. Our measure of harm is the person’s utility loss relative to following
his long-run desired behavior path, or equivalently his utility loss relative to being able to commit
prior to period 1 to some behavior path.25
De…nition 6. Starting from initial addiction level k1, if a person follows a strategy ® 6= ®tc,t h e n
he su¤ers a welfare loss of WL(k1;®)=U1(k1;® tc) ¡ U1(k1;®).
To assess when present-biased preferences can cause severe harm, we investigate the maximum
welfare loss that a person might su¤er as parameters of the model are varied. But since perception-
perfect strategies are unchanged by multiplicative transformations of the instantaneous utility
function, the magnitude of the welfare loss per se is not meaningful. We therefore explore the
magnitude of the welfare loss in two ways. First, we express welfare losses in proportion to ¢H,
which is the internality cost from hitting for one period. Calibrationwise, we can then derive the
potential harm from plausible self-control problems as a multiple of the internality cost from hitting
for one period, which in principle permits one to assess whether the potential harm is empirically
“large”. Second, we compare the potential harm for sophisticates and naifs to the potential harm
25 An alternative criterion is to measure welfare losses using period-1 preferences instead of long-
run preferences, where the benchmark strategy would be ®commit rather than ®tc. This criterion
would yield similar conclusions. A second, and more conservative, alternative is to assume there
are no “true preferences”, and consider Pareto comparisons (see, e.g., Goldman (1979) and Laibson
(1994, 1997)). In our model, sophisticates and naifs follow Pareto-dominated consumption paths
whenever they hit always despite preferring in period 1 to never hit, and therefore our welfare
approach yields similar conclusions to the more conservative approach. We prefer the long-run-
utility criterion because it permits discussion of the magnitude of harm.
19for hypothetical committers — people with present-biased preferences who can and must commit
in period 1 to their desired behavior path. Because committers have the same present-biased
preferences as sophisticates and naifs, these results illustrate how the dynamic, one-hit-at-a-time
nature of addictive choices contributes to the potential harm su¤ered by sophisticates and naifs.
We let ®commit denote the strategy chosen by committers, so welfare losses for committers are
WL(k1;® commit).
Proposition 3 describes the potential welfare losses for committers, sophisticates, and naifs who
are initially unaddicted. We restrict attention to the stationary linear model where f(k)=¡½k
and g(k)=¡Á½k for some Á>1,i nw h i c hc a s e¢H =
½
1¡±°.26 We derive the maximum welfare
loss when all parameters are …xed except the exogenous temptation ¹ xo.
Proposition 3. If f(k)=¡½k and g(k)=¡Á½k,t h e n :








±(1 ¡ ¯)Á¢H if 1 <Á· 1
1¡±+¯±
±(1¡¯)
1¡±+¯±¢H if Á ¸ 1
1¡±+¯±;
(2) max¹ xo2I R [WL(0;® s)] =
±(1¡¯)
1¡± ¢H for all Á>1;a n d





1¡± ¢H if 1 <Á· 1
1¡±+¯±
±(1¡¯)
1¡±+¯±¢H if Á ¸ 1
1¡±+¯±.
Part 1 derives the potential harm for hypothetical committers; the results re‡ect that for low
levels of habit formation committers are worst o¤ when they just prefer hitting once to never
hitting, whereas for high levels of habit formation committers are worst o¤ when they just prefer
hitting always to never hitting. But since committers follow their period-1 desired behavior path,
their potential harm is small in the sense that for plausible values of ¯ and ± — reasonably close
to 1 — the potential harm is less than ¢H.27
Unlike committers, sophisticates and naifs might hit always despite preferring to never hit, in
which case they can su¤er signi…cantly larger welfare losses. For sophisticates, such an outcome
can arise due to feelings of inevitability: Even when a person prefers never hitting to hitting
26 We believe our welfare conclusions hold qualitatively for more general stationary preferences.
27 It is instructive to calibrate our welfare results for some speci…c values of ¯ and ±.W e s h a l l
(somewhat arbitrarily) focus on two cases: (I) ¯ = :8 and ± = :95,a n d( I I )¯ = :99 and ±365 = :95.
Case I is meant to be plausible when the length of a period is on the order of one year, and Case
II is meant to be plausible when the length of a period is on the order of one day. The potential
harm for committers is at most :23¢H in Case I, and :01¢H in Case II.
20a l w a y s ,i fh eb e l i e v e st h a th ew i l lg e ta d d i c t e di nt h ef u t u r eh em a ys e en or e a s o nt or e f r a i nn o w .
Part 2 of Proposition 3 shows that such reasoning can lead to severe harm for sophisticates in
the sense that for plausible values of ¯ and ± their potential harm can be much larger than ¢H,
and is a multiple — greater than or equal to
1¡±+¯±
1¡± — of the potential harm for committers.28
The potential harm for sophisticates is independent of the degree of habit formation. If harmful
addictions are caused by sophistication and feelings of inevitability, the degree of habit formation
is irrelevant to the question of how much damage a person might do to himself when he chooses
t od e v e l o pa na d d i c t i o n .
Naifs might hit always despite preferring to never hit when they repeatedly plan on short-
term consumption and end up with long-term consumption. But the habit-forming property of
addictive goods tends to deter short-term consumption because short-term consumption creates
unwanted future withdrawal costs. Indeed, in a stationary model, if the product is su¢ciently
habit-forming, short-term consumption is never desirable. Part 3 of Proposition 3 re‡ects this
intuition by establishing that if the product is su¢ciently habit-forming — Á is large enough —
the potential harm for naifs is identical to that for committers. For smaller degrees of habit
formation, the potential harm for naifs is a multiple of that for committers, although it is smaller
than that for sophisticates.29 Figure 1 (drawn to scale for ¯ = :8 and ± = :95) depicts the results
from Proposition 3.
Our welfare results in Proposition 3 correspond to our earlier behavioral conclusion that so-
phisticates are more likely than naifs to develop an addiction. But naifs are more likely than
sophisticates to maintain an established addiction. To investigate the potential harm that naifs
could su¤er from maintaining an established addiction, Proposition 4 characterizes how the poten-
tial harm for hypothetical committers and for naifs depends on the initial addiction level.
28 Using the cases from footnote 27, the potential harm for sophisticates is 3:80¢H in Case I and
71:15¢H in Case II. These values are at least 16.5 times and 7115 times the potential harm for
committers, respectively.
29 Using the cases from footnote 27, the potential harm for naifs is identical to that for committers
if Á ¸ 1:23 in Case I and if Á ¸ 1:01 in Case II.
21Proposition 4. Let f(k)=¡½k, g(k)=¡Á½k,a n d… xÁ> 1
1¡±+¯±. There exists
k¤ 2 (0;kmax) such that:













if k1 · k¤
±(1 ¡ ¯)Á¢H if k1 ¸ k¤;
















1¡± ¢H if k1 ¸ k¤.
Proposition 4 …xes the degree of habit formation to be su¢ciently large that an unaddicted naif
would not su¤er severe harm. If a person is su¢ciently unaddicted, then short-term consumption
is not desirable for the reasons outlined above, and the potential harm for naifs is identical to that
for committers. But as the person becomes more addicted, a new force becomes important. Unlike
an unaddicted person, an addicted person who plans to eventually quit must incur withdrawal
costs from past consumption. While current consumption still creates additional unwanted future
withdrawal costs, which tends to deter current consumption, current consumption also delays the
withdrawal costs from past consumption, which tends to encourage current consumption. For a
su¢ciently addicted person, the latter e¤ect dominates, and therefore the potential harm for naifs
can be a multiple of the potential harm for committers. Indeed, for k1 = kmax,t h ep o t e n t i a lh a r m
for naifs is 1
1¡± times the potential harm for committers.30 F i g u r e2( d r a w nt os c a l ef o r¯ = :8,
± = :95,a n dÁ =1 :5) depicts the results from Proposition 4.
Hence, in our stationary model, there are two sources of severe harm. To the extent that people
are sophisticated, they may su¤er severe harm when they develop an addiction due to feelings
of inevitability. To the extent that people are naive, they may su¤er severe harm when they
procrastinate quitting an established addiction. While this latter source is relatively unimportant
in the stationary model — because naifs would never develop the addiction in the …rst place — it
becomes crucial in the more realistic non-stationary case we consider next.
5. Youthful Preferences
Whereas in Section 4 we assume that the instantaneous utility function is constant over time,
in this section we explore the implications of one particular type of non-stationarity wherein the
30 Also note that the larger the degree of habit formation, the larger is the potential harm for
naifs. Intuitively, the more habit-forming is the product, the more prone are naifs to procrastinate
quitting.




xt + f(k) if a =1
yt + g(k) if a =0
where ¹ x1 ¸ ¹ x2 ¸ ::: ¸ ¹ xM =¹ xM+1 = ::: =¹ xT.
Because the temptation to hit in period t is ht(k) ´ [xt ¡ yt]+[ f(k) ¡ g(k)], this assumption
implies that, while the endogenous temptation f(k)¡ g(k) is independent of the person’s age, the
exogenous temptation ¹ xt ´ xt ¡ yt decreases as the person ages. Our formal results also assume
that a person eventually “matures” in that beginning in some period M<1 preferences become
stationary; this is a vacuous limitation for T<1, but is a restriction in the in…nite-horizon case
on which we focus.31
Youthful preferences might re‡ect forces such as peer pressure and intrinsic biological factors
that lead people to face larger temptations while young than they do later in life. Youthful
preferences might also re‡ect the e¤ects of a traumatic life event, such as a divorce, loss of a job, or
death of a loved one: After a traumatic event, a person may have an increased desire to consume an
addictive product for some duration, but eventually the desire to consume returns to more normal
levels. Most importantly, youthful preferences permit the reasonable assumption that an addictive
product is intrinsically appealing early in life but not later in life.
We …rst ask how our conclusions from the stationary model change in the youthful model.
Lemma 6 provides some preliminary results for how the three types behave in the youthful model.
Lemma 6. Under youthful instantaneous utilities and T = 1:
(1) ¹ ktc
t · ¹ ktc
t+1 for all t,
(2) ¹ kn
t · ¹ kn
t+1 for all t,a n d
(3) If ¹ xM ¸ ¯±¢H,t h e n®s(k;t)=1for all k and t.I f¹ xM <¯ ± ¢H, then there exists k0 > 0
such that for all t ¸ M, ®s(k;t)=0for all k<k 0.
31 The assumption of a maturity date is used only for results concerning sophisticates; we con-
jecture that our results and intuitions for sophisticates hold more generally. As in the stationary
model, for sophisticates we restrict attention to perception-perfect strategies for the in…nite horizon
that correspond to the unique perception-perfect strategy for some long, …nite horizon, where we
…x a …nite maturity date M and let T become large.
23Parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 6 establish that for both TCs and naifs, the cuto¤ addiction level above
which the person hits is smaller in earlier periods. The intuition is simple: In the youthful model
the temptation to hit is larger in earlier periods, and since TCs and naifs plan to follow optimal
consumption paths, they are each more likely to hit in earlier periods. An immediate implication of
this result is that both TCs and naifs hit …rst and refrain later: Starting from any situation, they
either never hit again, hit for a …nite number of periods and then never hit again, or hit always.
Part 3 of Lemma 6 establishes that, in contrast to the stationary model where the crucial
question for sophisticates is whether they feel that addiction is inevitable in period 1, the crucial
question in the youthful model is whether they feel that addiction is inevitable at maturity,w h i c h
holds if ¹ xM ¸ ¯±¢H. If a sophisticate views addiction as inevitable at maturity, then he clearly
hits throughout his youth when the temptation to hit is even larger. If, in contrast, the sophisticate
would refrain once mature if su¢ciently unaddicted, then he may refrain in his youth as well.
Proposition 5 shows that, as in the stationary model, the inevitability condition determines
when the incentive e¤ect is operative, and hence determines when sophisticates are less or more
prone to hit than naifs.
Proposition 5. Under youthful instantaneous utilities and T = 1:
(1) If ¹ xM ¸ ¯±¢H,t h e n®s(k;t) ¸ ®n(k;t) for all k and t,a n d
(2) If ¹ xM <¯ ± ¢H,t h e n®s(k;t) · ®n(k;t) for all k and t.
Proposition 5 implies that if an addictive product eventually loses its intrinsic appeal, sophisti-
cates are never more prone to hit than naifs. Moreover, unlike in the stationary model, sophisticates
can be strictly less prone to hit than naifs even when unaddicted, as illustrated in Example 3.
Example 3: Suppose ± = :9, ¯ = :5,a n d° =0 .L e t f(k)=¡3k, g(k)=¡12k,a n ds u p p o s e
¹ x1 =8and ¹ xt =1for all t ¸ 2. Then starting from k1 =0 :
(1) TCs never hit,
(2) Naifs hit always, and
(3) Sophisticates never hit.
In Example 3, once they reach maturity in period 2, both naifs and sophisticates will refrain for-
ever after if and only if they are unhooked at t =2 . Hence, the incentive e¤ect becomes important
for preventing unwanted addictions. Sophisticates recognize that indulging in the youthful temp-
tation would lead to a lifetime of hitting, and so refrain to induce good behavior in their maturity.
24Naifs, in contrast, think in their youth that they can indulge in the large youthful temptation and
later quit, but this unfortunately leads to a lifetime of hitting. Example 3 illustrates an important
di¤erence between the stationary and youthful models: In the youthful model, persistent restraint
can reduce the temptation to hit even for an unaddicted person, and hence the incentive e¤ect can
dominate the pessimism e¤ect even for an unaddicted person.
Hence, stationary models may make overly pessimistic predictions for sophisticates, and overly
optimistic predictions for naifs. To allow a more systematic analysis of these points, we de…ne a
formal sense in which a given youthful environment is comparable to a stationary environment.
We de…ne a youthful rotation to be a transformation of stationary environment into a youthful
environment that holds constant both the period-1 utility from hitting always and the period-1
utility from never hitting.
De…nition 7. Consider stationary instantaneous utility function
ut(a;k) ´
½
xo + f(k) if a =1
g(k) if a =0




xt + f(k) if a =1
g(k) if a =0
for some x1 ¸ x2 ¸ ::: ¸ xM = xM+1 = ::: = xT.W es a yt h a t^ uM
t is a youthful rotation of ut
if x1 >x o and x1 + ¯
T P
t=2




Because a youthful rotation makes early-life hitting more attractive and late-life hitting less
attractive, a youthful rotation can clearly cause a person to switch either from never hitting or
from always hitting to hitting only in his youth. The more interesting question is whether a
youthful rotation can cause a person to switch from hitting always to never hitting and vice-versa.
Example 4 (which extends Example 3) illustrates that a youthful rotation can have opposite
implications for naifs and sophisticates.
Example 4: Suppose ± = :9, ¯ = :5,a n d° =0 .L e t f(k)=¡3k, g(k)=¡12k,a n ds u p p o s e
k1 =0 :
(1) If ¹ xt =1 :7 for all t ¸ 1, then sophisticates hit always whereas naifs never hit; and
(2) If ¹ x1 =8and ¹ xt =1for all t ¸ 2, then naifs hit always whereas sophisticates never hit.
In Example 4, the youthful rotation causes naifs to switch from never hitting to hitting always.
In the stationary model, naifs desired and actual behavior is to never hit. The youthful rotation
makes them plan to hit in their youth and later quit, but once they have become hooked on the
25product, they never quit. In contrast, the youthful rotation causes sophisticates to switch from
hitting always to never hitting. In the stationary model, sophisticates hit always even though
they would prefer to never hit because they believe late-life hitting is inevitable. By decreasing
the temptation later in life, the youthful rotation eliminates the inevitability of addiction, and
therefore enables sophisticates to refrain always.
Example 4 accords with our claim above that stationary models may make overly pessimistic
predictions for sophisticates, and overly optimistic predictions for naifs. Proposition 6 addresses
whether youthful rotation might lead to switches in the other direction.
Proposition 6. Suppose ^ uM
t is a youthful rotation of ut,a n dl e tan, as, b an,a n db asdenote the
perception-perfect behavior paths given k1 =0under ut and ^ uM
t .T h e n :
(1) an =( 1 ;1;:::) implies b an 6=( 0 ;0;:::);a n d
(2) if M =2 ,t h e nas =( 0 ;0;:::) implies b as 6=( 1 ;1:::);o t h e r w i s eas =( 0 ;0;:::) and b as =( 1 ;1:::)
only if an =( 0 ;0;:::) and b an =( 1 ;1;:::).
Part 1 establishes that, because for naifs a youthful rotation always makes period-1 hitting
more likely, a youthful rotation never can cause naifs to switch from hitting always to never
hitting. Sophisticates, however, can sometimes switch from never hitting to hitting always. But
this outcome can arise only due to pessimism about over-consumption in his future youth, and in
particular the person hits always after the youthful rotation because he prefers a lifelong addiction
beginning now as opposed to a short-term addiction beginning in the future. Part 2 helps illustrate
this point by establishing that this outcome cannot arise when one’s youth lasts only one period, in
which case there is no future youth to be pessimistic about. Part 2 also establishes that whenever
this outcome arises, it must be the case that the youthful rotation a¤ects naifs in exactly the same
way.
We next explore the welfare implications of present-biased preferences in the youthful model.
Again, we are interested in when present-biased preferences can cause severe harm, and hence
focus on maximum possible welfare losses. Proposition 7 characterizes the potential harm for
hypothetical committers and naifs who are initially unaddicted:
26Proposition 7. If f(k)=¡½k and g(k)=¡Á½k,t h e n :




= ±(1 ¡ ¯)Á¢H for any Á>1;a n d
(2) max(¹ x1;¹ x2;:::)2I R1 [WL(0;® n)] =
±(1¡¯)Á¢H
1¡± for any Á>1.
The youthful environment is problematic for naifs because they can be tempted in their youth
to acquire an addiction that they delay quitting for the rest of their lives. Indeed, Proposition 7
reveals two senses in which naive self-control problems can lead to severe harm in this environment.
First, a comparison of naifs to committers in the youthful model reveals that the potential harm
for naifs is 1
1¡± times the potential harm for committers for any degree of habit formation. Second,
a comparison of naifs in the stationary vs. youthful model — comparing Propositions 3 and 7
— reveals that the potential harm for naifs is much higher in the youthful model, and moreover,
whereas increased habit formation reduces potential harm in the stationary model, it increases
potential harm in the youthful model. Figure 3 (drawn to scale for ¯ = :8 and ± = :95) highlights
these points.
While we have not found any general welfare results for sophisticates, we can describe the ways
in which sophisticates might harm themselves. We …rst note that in situations where there is an
inevitability to addiction at maturity, sophisticates can su¤er welfare losses in much the same way
as they do in the stationary model — because they develop a lifelong addiction due to a lifelong
feeling of inevitability. Clearly the potential harm from such an addiction can be just as large as
— but no larger than — that for the stationary model.
If, in contrast, there is no inevitability at maturity, sophisticates can su¤er welfare losses of a
di¤erent form. First, sophisticates might su¤er welfare losses because they hit too much during
their youth, as illustrated in Example 5.
Example 5: Suppose ± = :9, ¯ = :6,a n d° =0 .L e t f(k)=¡20k, g(k)=¡25k,a n ds u p p o s e
M>2, ¹ xt =1 5for all t<M,a n d¹ xt =5for all t ¸ M. Then starting from k1 =0 :
(1) TCs never hit,
(2) Sophisticates hit for the …rst M ¡ 1 periods and then refrain thereafter.
In Example 5, sophisticates correctly predict that they will refrain once mature no matter what
they do during their youth. As a result, some indulgence in their youth is “safe” in the sense that
it won’t cause a lifelong addiction, and in this example sophisticates end up indulging throughout
their youth. Such over-indulgence during one’s youth can cause welfare losses because sophisticates
give too little weight to the eventual withdrawal costs.
27The second way in which sophisticates can hurt themselves that cannot arise in the stationary
model is that they might under-consume in their youth as a means of preempting over-consumption
at maturity. Example 6 illustrates this possibility:
Example 6: Suppose ± = :9, ¯ = :9,a n d° = :999.L e tf(k)=¡k, g(k)=¡2:5k,a n ds u p p o s e
¹ x1 =2 4 , ¹ x2 =¹ x3 =1 8 :6,a n d¹ xt =0for all t ¸ 4. Then starting from k1 =0 :
( 1 )T C sh i ti np e r i o d1a n dt h e nr e f r a i nt h e r e a f t e r ,
(2) To preempt consumption in periods 2 and 3, sophisticates never hit.
In Example 6, both TCs and sophisticates would like to hit in period 1 when the enjoyment from
hitting is very high, and then never hit again. TCs follow precisely this plan. But sophisticates
recognize that hitting in period 1 would lead to unwanted further consumption in periods 2 and 3,
and therefore refrain in period 1. Examples 5 and 6 illustrate that even when the incentive e¤ect
is operative, sophisticates can still su¤er welfare losses. But our impression from the examples we
have worked through is that under the reasonable assumption that addiction is not inevitable at
maturity, sophisticates are much less prone to su¤er severe welfare losses in the youthful model
than in the stationary model.
The youthful model can also be used to shed light on an issue that we feel is misleadingly
discussed in the rational-addiction literature. Using a stationary model, Becker and Murphy (1988)
describe how it can be optimal for a person to maintain an established harmful addiction, but their
use of steady-state analysis prevents them from analyzing why a person would choose to develop
the harmful addiction in the …rst place.32 They suggest that events such as youth, divorce, and
death of a loved one are plausible sources of harmful addictions. Our youthful model allows us
to directly investigate this hypothesis, because we can ask whether and by how much traumatic
events can harm a person by leading him to develop an addiction.
Suppose that, absent a traumatic event, a person has a stationary, linear instantaneous utility
function with no intrinsic desire to hit — that is, for all t
ut(a;k) ´
½
¡½k if a =1
¡(½ + ¾)k if a =0 .
32 This shortcoming has been recognized in the rational-addiction literature, and …xes have been
proposed. Orphanides and Zervos (1995) and Wang (1999) posit that people might develop harmful
addictions due to rational uncertainty about the addictiveness of a product. Suranovic, Goldfarb,
and Leonard (1999) and Goldbaum (2000) posit that people might get addicted while young and
later quit because the detrimental e¤ects of consumption occur mainly at the end of a person’s
life. We discuss these phenomena in the conclusion.
28With such instantaneous utilities, an unaddicted person would never hit —regardless of his type
— but a person with an established addiction might. Suppose that a traumatic event increases the
temptation to consume for N periods, and in particular makes refraining more painful. Formally,
we assume that the person faces instantaneous utility function
ut(a;k) ´
½
¡½k if a =1
¡yt ¡ (½ + ¾)k if a =0
where y1 ¸ y2 ¸ ::: ¸ yN > 0 and yt =0for all t>N.
For all three types, a traumatic event could of course cause a lifelong addiction. This qualitative
aspect of Becker and Murphy’s story is obviously correct. But how harmful could such an addiction
be? For TCs and sophisticates, there is a sense in which the answer is not very harmful:




















Absent the traumatic event, all three types would never hit and therefore experience long-run
utility U1(0;® i)=0 . Proposition 8 therefore describes by how much a person might be hurt by the
traumatic event. Part 1 establishes that the most a TC might be hurt is by the present discounted
sum of the pain from not consuming during the traumatic event. Intuitively, if a traumatic event
causes a TC to develop an addiction, then at the moment the traumatic event occurs developing
the addiction is better than never hitting.33 Part 2 establishes that a similar result holds for
sophisticates. Given no intrinsic desire to hit absent the traumatic event, a sophisticate does not
view a lifelong addiction as inevitable — if he can reach the end of the traumatic event su¢ciently
unhooked, then he will refrain thereafter. This knowledge limits how much the sophisticate can be
hurt by the traumatic event, because if a lifelong addiction is too harmful then he’ll make sure to
reach the end of the traumatic event su¢ciently unhooked.34
By contrast, a traumatic event can lead naifs to develop a lifelong addiction well out of pro-
33 For TCs, a second qualitative feature of “traumatic-event-caused” addictions is that the person
consciously chooses to develop the addiction at the moment the traumatic event occurs. While
traumatic events may lead some people to consciously choose a lifelong addiction — as in the movie
Leaving Las Vegas — we suspect that many such addictions are not intentional.
34 Proposition 8 provides a lower bound on sophisticates’ utility, but for many (y1;:::;yN) this
bound cannot be achieved. Hence, Proposition 8 overstates by how much sophisticates can be
hurt.
29portion from the pain of the traumatic event itself. A naif may think it is safe to hit during the
traumatic event because he’ll quit once sobriety becomes less painful. But if consuming during
the traumatic event gets him su¢ciently addicted, the naif procrastinates quitting and as a result
su¤ers large harm. The cleanest case to illustrate this point is for a one-period traumatic event
when ° =0 .
























The source of harm for naifs in Example 7 is not the traumatic event per se, but rather that
naifs fail to quit the addiction caused by the traumatic event. Indeed, the additional harm that
naifs might su¤er relative to sophisticates is essentially the maximum welfare loss that they might
su¤er from not quitting an established addiction. As long as the future is important enough —
± is close enough to 1 — this latter source of harm can be many times the pain of the traumatic
event itself. Hence, our model suggests that traumatic events may be a plausible source of severely
harmful addictions for naifs, but not for TCs and sophisticates.
6. Price E¤ects
In this section, we examine the e¤ects of price on consumption. Because our analysis of prices is
conducted within the con…nes of our binary-choice model, it is crude in a number of ways. But we
feel it captures some important intuitions that would hold in a more general model. Our main goal
is to provide some intuition for why existing empirical evidence often invoked as support for the
rational-choice (exponential) model of addiction may in fact be more supportive of a self-control
model of addiction.
To introduce prices into our model of instantaneous utilities, we suppose that in period t the
person consumes the addictive product and “other goods”. We assume that the person’s income
in period t is Yt, and that he cannot borrow or save. The price of the addictive product in period
t is pt, and we normalize the price of other goods to one. Hence, in period t, if the person refrains
then he consumes quantity Yt of other goods, and if he hits then he consumes quantity Yt ¡ pt of
other goods. Assuming that utility from the addictive product is stationary and that utility from
other goods is stationary, linear, and additively separable from utility from the addictive product,
30we can re-write the person’s instantaneous utility function as:
ut(a;k) ´
½
f(k)+[ Yt ¡ pt] if a =1
g(k)+[ Yt] if a =0 .
Because of the discreteness of our model, there is limited scope for studying marginal price
changes. We can, however, analyze marginal changes in the cuto¤ addiction level for which a
person consumes. That is, Lemma 1 implies that for any price vector (p1;:::;pT), both TCs and
naifs follow a cuto¤ strategy, and we analyze how price changes a¤ect the period-1 cuto¤s ¹ ktc
1 and
¹ kn
1. Both for simplicity (because sophisticates need not follow a cuto¤ rule) and because we believe
naivete is the more empirically relevant case (at least among people with harmful addictions), we
con…ne our analysis to TCs and naifs.
We suppose that there is initially a …xed price ¹ p —i . e . ,pt =¹ p for all t — and consider three
price comparative statics: an immediate permanent price change — a change in ¹ p —w h i c hw e
denote by d¹ ki
1=d¹ p; an immediate temporary price change — a change in p1 holding pt =¹ p for all
t 6=1— which we denote by d¹ ki
1=dp1; and an expected future temporary price change — a change
in a future price p¿ holding pt =¹ p for all t 6= ¿ — which we denote by d¹ ki
1=dp¿.35
It is straightforward to derive that all qualitative price comparative statics are the same: For
both TCs and naifs, a price increase — whether it be permanent, immediate temporary, or future
temporary — causes a person’s cuto¤ ¹ k1 to increase, which means the person is less prone to
consume in period 1.36 Much as we discussed for Example 2, simple comparative static results are
the same for TCs and naifs. Indeed, Gruber and Koszegi (2001) discuss price comparative statics
in a continuous-choice model (with additional assumptions about functional forms), and reach the
same conclusion for TCs vs. sophisticates. Hence, the most common test of the rational-choice
model of addiction — whether current consumption depends on future prices — does not test
whether people have self-control problems. Our point in this section, however, is that if one looks
more carefully at these empirical results, they may be more supportive of a self-control model of
addiction.
Because in our model absolute price comparative statics are not meaningful, we focus on relative
price comparative statics — e.g., the impact of a permanent price change relative to the impact
of a temporary price change. Proposition 9 derives some relative price comparative statics. The
35 This technique is essentially the same as that used in Becker and Murphy (1988) and Gruber
and Koszegi (2001,2002).
36 There is one caveat: In situations where they don’t expect to consume in the future, naifs have
no reaction to future price changes. But this no-reaction result is an artifact of our discrete-choice
model. All relevant price comparative statics are derived in the proof of Proposition 9 below.
31values kN;A(¯;¹ p) and kN;1(¯; ¹ p) are the analogues of kN;A(¯) and kN;1(¯) in Section 4 (for a …xed
price ¹ p the price model is equivalent to the stationary model).
Proposition 9. Suppose pt =¹ p for all t,a n dt h a t¹ ktc
1 ;¹ kn
1 2 (0;kmax). Then:




















(2) For people with present-biased preferences who are naive:





































Part 1 presents comparative statics for TCs. For a …xed price ¹ p,T C sh i ti np e r i o d1i fa n do n l y
if a lifetime of hitting is preferred to a lifetime of restraint. Hence, a price change a¤ects behavior
only to the extent that it makes a lifetime of hitting look more or less worthwhile, and therefore
t h er e l a t i v ep r i c ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c sa r ee q u a lt ot h er e l a t i v ea m o u n t sb yw h i c hc u r r e n t ,f u t u r e ,
and permanent price changes a¤ect the cost of hitting always.
Part 2 presents comparative statics for naifs. Lemma 5 establishes that for a …xed price ¹ p,t h e
cuto¤ for naifs can be either the addiction level at which the person is indi¤erent between never
hitting and hitting always or the addiction level at which the person is indi¤erent between never
hitting and hitting once. In the former case, where naifs like TCs hit in period 1 if and only
if a lifetime of hitting is preferred to a lifetime of restraint, part 2a establishes that the relative
comparative statics are similar to those for TCs, di¤ering only to the extent that naifs discount
future periods by the factor ¯. In the latter case, naifs hit in period 1 if and only if hitting
once is preferred to never hitting, and hence a price change a¤ects behavior only to the extent
that it a¤ects the utility of hitting once. Part 2b establishes that this case yields very di¤erent
comparative statics. In particular, because an individual with k1 near ¹ kn
1 does not plan to consume
in the future, future prices do not a¤ect the cuto¤ (at least for small price changes).
Table 1 explores for some reasonable parameter values of ¯ and ± what these relative price
comparative statics should be.
32Table 1: (Unanticipated) Price Comparative Statics in Our Model
Elasticity TCs
Naifs if
kN;A(¯; ¹ p) <k N;1(¯; ¹ p)
Naifs if
kN;A(¯; ¹ p) >k N;1(¯; ¹ p)
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Table 1 reveals that for TCs with a reasonable yearly discount factor ±, temporary price changes
now vs. next period have similar e¤ects on the period-1 cuto¤, whereas a permanent price change
has a much larger e¤ect. Similar conclusions hold for naifs when their cuto¤ is the addiction level
at which they are indi¤erent between never hitting and hitting always. But when the cuto¤ for
naifs is the addiction level at which they are indi¤erent between never hitting and hitting once, a
very di¤erent pattern emerges. Because future price changes do not a¤ect the cuto¤, a temporary
price change next period has a very small e¤ect relative to a temporary price change now, and a
permanent price change and an immediate temporary price change have identical e¤ects.
While these comparative statics are arti…cially extreme due to our crude model, they re‡ect
the more general point that, because naifs underestimate how much they’ll consume in the future,
future prices matter much less for naifs than for TCs. To further illustrate this point, consider a
person who has a pack-a-day smoking habit. If this person is time-consistent, he smokes one pack
a day because doing so is optimal, and moreover he plans to be smoking one pack a day. Because
a temporary change in the price of cigarettes has only a small e¤ect on the lifetime cost of his
chosen behavior, whereas a permanent change in the price of cigarettes signi…cantly changes the
lifetime cost of smoking one pack a day, for TCs permanent price changes should have signi…cantly
larger e¤ects than temporary price changes. Suppose instead that the person has present-biased
preferences and is naive, in which case he may be smoking one pack a day his entire life not because
he …nds a lifetime pack-a-day habit optimal, but rather because he always plans to smoke one pack
a day for a short while and then quit. For such a person, the only relevant prices are those for the
near future. Hence, a permanent price change and an immediate temporary price change should
33have similar e¤ects on consumption.
In this light, we now reinterpret the empirical literature on rational addiction. The main
empirical …nding is that consumption of addictive products depends on past and future prices,
suggesting both that the products are indeed addictive and that people are forward-looking and take
into account how current consumption a¤ects future well-being.37 But a puzzle in this literature
is that temporary price changes and permanent price changes have similar e¤ects on consumption.
As an example, Table 2 presents the price elasticities derived in Becker, Grossman, and Murphy’s
1994 study of cigarette consumption, where "(x;y) is the point elasticity of variable x with respect
to variable y.
Table 2: (Unanticipated) Price Elasticities from
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994, Table 4)
Elasticity Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (iv)
"(Ct;p t) ¡0:349 ¡0:322 ¡0:316 ¡0:262
"(Ct;p t+1) ¡0:050 ¡0:084 ¡0:058 ¡0:068
"(Ct; ¹ p) ¡0:407 ¡0:436 ¡0:387 ¡0:355
"(Ct;p t+1)="(Ct;p t)0 :14 0:26 0:18 0:26
"(Ct; ¹ p)="(Ct;p t)1 :17 1:35 1:22 1:35
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy recognize the puzzle, noting that the regression results reported
above imply absurd yearly discount rates ranging from 56.3% to 222.6%. They conclude that the
data is too coarse to identify the discount rate. But Table 2 reveals that the relative comparative
statics look very much like those for naifs in our model — that is, close to zero and one rather than
one and much larger than one. Hence, our self-control model of addiction suggests an alternative
explanation for the puzzling empirical results: While the regression results imply absurd discount
rates under the maintained hypothesis of time consistency, they may be quite consistent with
plausible discount rates once one permits that people might have a small self-control problem
about which they are naive.38
37 We emphasize again that while these results are consistent with the rational-choice model of
addiction, they are also consistent with a self-control model of addiction.
38 One of our goals for the future is to develop a self-control model that can be more readily taken
to the data so as to further test this hypothesis.
347. Discussion
Over the years, economists have become habituated to the exponential-discounting model. The
evidence, however, overwhelmingly supports the hypothesis that people have present-biased pref-
erences.39 Although time consistency is often a useful approximation to the more realistic model
of present-biased preferences, intuition suggests self-control problems matter a lot for addiction.
Our goal in this paper has been to formally investigate this hypothesis.
Our main concern has been determining in what ways self-control problems might lead to
severely harmful addictions. Our analysis suggests that sophisticated self-control problems are
most likely to cause severe harm in relatively stationary environments in which the person feels that
eventual addiction is inevitable. Our analysis suggests that naive self-control problems are most
likely to generate severe harm in non-stationary environments in which large temporary temptations
induce them to develop addictions that they procrastinate quitting. In real-world environments,
non-stationarities in the temptation to consume seem quite likely, especially declines in temptation
over time such that unaddicted people are eventually not tempted. Hence, we interpret our analysis
to suggest that for realistic environments, self-control problems are a plausible source of harmful
addictions only in conjunction with naivete.
While the most likely source harm from naivete is simple over-consumption, Example 8 indicates
a second way in which naivete can cause harm in the face of non-stationarities:
Example 8: Suppose ± = :9, ¯ = :6,a n d° = :5.L e t f(k)=¡4k, g(k)=¡24k, and suppose
¹ xt =1 7for t odd and ¹ xt = ¡16 for t even. Then starting from k1 =2 =3:
(1) TCs never hit,
(2) Naifs hit in odd periods but refrain in even periods, and
(3) Sophisticates hit always.
In Example 8, the exogenous temptation to hit ‡uctuates between a high level and a low
level. While sophisticates consume more than naifs in this example, they are in fact su¤ering less
harm.40 Both consume more than is optimal, but the welfare cost is very much not monotonic in
consumption — if a person simply cannot su¢ciently control himself, he may in fact be better o¤
succumbing fully to his addiction rather than trying to eliminate it. Misguided and unpleasant
39 Indeed, every study with which we are familiar that has explicitly compared the empirical …t
of di¤erent discount functions supports present-biased preferences over time-consistent preferences
(and also over “future-biased preferences”).
40 It is easy to show that U1(k1;® s) >U 1(k1;® n).
35attempts to quit addictions, followed by relapse, may represent another signi…cant problem for
naifs.
We predict that models of addiction that incorporate self-control problems, especially when they
allow for some degree of naivete, will prove superior to rational-choice models. Behaviorally, while
we suspect such models will sometimes generate sounder qualitative predictions, we believe they
are most likely to prove their superiority by being quantitatively more accurate. Our analysis in
Section 6 illustrates this point: Under the maintained hypothesis of time consistency, the empirical
addiction results imply absurd discount rates, whereas the same results are consistent with plausible
discount rates and a small present bias about which the person is naive. More generally, we suspect
that if one were to estimate discount rates and the various properties of addictive products, the
behavior of addicts just wouldn’t accord well with the rational-choice model, but might accord well
with a self-control model.
The most important advantage of self-control models, however, is that they permit more accurate
welfare conclusions. It certainly seems possible that people develop and maintain addictions against
their long-run best interests, and cause themselves severe harm in the process. By ap r i o r iassuming
that people always act in their own self-interest, the rational-choice model precludes itself from
investigating this possibility. We believe that economically rigorous self-control models will prove
especially useful for welfare analysis.41
While we have pursued the narrow goal of determining how self-control problems contribute
to harmful addictions, it is likely that other errors contribute importantly to harmful addictions.
One broad category deserves special attention. Our model of addiction above assumes that tastes
change over time for a variety of reasons, including negative internalities, habit formation, the
aging process, and environmental ‡uctuations. Orphanides and Zervos (1995) and Wang (1999)
assume that there is uncertainty about the addictiveness of a product and that people learn from
experience. Suranovic, Goldfarb, and Leonard (1999) and Goldbaum (2000) assume that the
detrimental e¤ects of consumption occur mainly at the end of a person’s life. Whereas the rational-
choice model would assume that people accurately understand all of this richness, it seems unlikely
that people do so. Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2000), for instance, review evidence
of a general form of misprediction of future preferences wherein people underappreciate changes
41 The reader might worry that policy analysis based on the possibility that people are not 100%
rational will automatically lead to strongly paternalistic policies. But as we discuss elsewhere (see
in particular O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999c) and Camerer, Issacharo¤, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue,
and Rabin (2002)), there are often approaches to policy prescription that adhere to principles of
“cautious paternalism” wherein we look for policies that can be bene…cial for people who make
errors while having very little e¤ect for people who are fully rational.
36in their tastes. Such errors could clearly lead to harmful addictions; a person might develop a
harmful addiction because she incorrectly believes that large youthful temptations will last forever,
or because she underappreciates the addictiveness of the product. In addition, if such errors lead
people to underestimate future consumption, they might also help explain the price elasticities
discussed in Section 6. We expect that future research will evaluate the implications of such errors,
and how they interact with self-control problems.
Whether it be the unpleasantness of failed attempts to quit or the more fundamental problem
of over-consumption, it is at a minimum plausible that self-control problems and other errors
are a major facet of cigarette, alcohol, and other forms of addiction. If economists want to be
serious contributors to research on policy debate about addiction, we need to develop a systematic
approach to investigating whether and how self-control problems and other errors contribute to
addiction, rather than restricting our research ap r i o r ito rational choice. We hope our analysis
will prove useful in this regard.
37Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :For use in this and other proofs, we de…ne some additional notation. De…ne
At ´f 0;1gT¡t+1, where at ´ (at;a t+1;:::;aT) 2A t designates a behavior path beginning from
period t.D e … n eVt(kt;at) to be long-run continuation utility from following behavior path at given
period-t addiction level kt.D e … n e K¿(kt;at) ´ °¿¡tkt +
P¿¡1
i=t °¿¡i¡1ai, which is the person’s


















By assumption ft and gt are weakly convex, and K¿ is increasing and linear in kt, and therefore
Vt is weakly convex in kt. We assume throughout that maxa2At V t(k;a) exists for all k and t (see
footnote 14).
(1) Since TCs are time-consistent, any perception-perfect strategy ®tc must satisfy for all t
Ut(k;®tc)=m a x
a2At V t(k;a).
To prove uniqueness, suppose that ®tc and ^ ®tc are both perception-perfect strategies for TCs.







°k +1 ;® tc¢¤
,a n d







°k +1 ; ^ ®tc¢¤
. But since for all k and t,
Ut(k;®tc)=Ut(k; ^ ®tc)=m a x a2At V t(k;a), it follows that for all k and t, ®tc(k;t)=1if and only
if ^ ®tc(k;t)=1—t h a ti s ,®tc and ^ ®tc m u s tb et h es a m es t r a t e g y .
For all t, Ut(k;®tc) is the upper envelope of the set of weakly convex functions Vt(k;at), at 2A t,
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.S i n c eht(k) is increasing in k for all t, it follows that for all
t there exists ¹ ktc
t such that ®tc(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ ¹ ktc
t .







°k +1 ;® tc¢¤
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is weakly decreasing in k and ht(k) is increasing in k,i tf o l l o w s
that for all t there exists ¹ kn
t such that ®n(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ ¹ kn
t .
(3) Since ft and gt are both decreasing in k for all t, V t(k;a) is decreasing in k for all t and a 2A t,

























, it follows that ®tc(k;t) · ®n(k;t) for all k and t,w h i c hi n
38turn implies ¹ ktc
t ¸ ¹ kn
t for all t.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : De…ne at+1 ´ (at+1;:::;aT) and at+10 ´ (a0
t+1;:::;a 0
T).D e … n e k¿L =
K¿(°kt;at+1), k¿H = K¿(°kt +1 ;at+1), k0
¿L = K¿(°kt;at+10),a n dk0
¿H = K¿(°kt +1 ;at+10).
Note that for all ¿, k¿L¡k¿H = k0
¿L¡k0
¿H = °¿¡t¡1.M o r e o v e r ,a¿ ¸ a0
¿ for all ¿ implies k¿L ¸ k0
¿L
and k¿H ¸ k0
¿H for all ¿.L e tI(E) be an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if E is true and
0 otherwise. Then for ® and ®0 as described in the premise,
[Ut+1(°kt;®) ¡ Ut+1(°kt +1 ;®)] ¡ [Ut+1(°kt;® 0) ¡ Ut+1(°kt +1 ;® 0)] =
PT
¿=t I(a¿ = a0





¿=t I(a¿ = a0





¿=t I(a¿ >a 0
¿)±¿¡t[(f¿(k¿L) ¡ f¿(k¿H)) ¡ (g¿(k0
¿L) ¡ g¿(k0
¿H))].
Given k¿L ¡ k¿H = k0
¿L ¡ k0
¿H and k¿L ¸ k0
¿L, f¿ weakly convex implies (f¿(k¿L) ¡ f¿(k¿H)) ¡
(f¿(k0
¿L) ¡ f¿(k0
¿H)) · 0 for all ¿,a n dg¿ weakly convex implies (g¿(k¿L) ¡ g¿(k¿H))¡
(g¿(k0
¿L) ¡ g¿(k0







¿H) · 0 for all ¿ because k0
¿L · k0
¿H and
h is increasing. Hence, [Ut+1(°kt;®) ¡ Ut+1(°kt +1 ;®)] ¡ [Ut+1(°kt;® 0) ¡ Ut+1(°kt +1 ;® 0)] · 0,
and the result follows.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :T = 1 implies that At = f0;1g1 for all t, and then stationary preferences
imply that V t(kt;at) is independent of t, and therefore Ut(k;®tc)=m a x a2At V t(k;a) is independent
of t. Stationary preferences also imply that ht(k) is independent of t.B e c a u s e®tc(k;t)=1if and








,i tf o l l o w st h a t®tc(k;t) is independent of
t, in which case Lemma 1(1) implies that TCs have a stationary cuto¤ ¹ ktc. Similarly, because








, it follows that ®n(k;t)
is independent of t, in which case Lemma 1(2) implies that naifs have a stationary cuto¤ ¹ kn.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :When T<1, ®s is unique (since we assume a person hits when indi¤erent).
Our “limit-of-the-…nite-horizon” reasoning involves solving for this strategy and asking what it
looks like far from the end of the game. To make such arguments, two new pieces of notation will
be useful:
De…ne ~ ¢H(k;´) to be the future cost from hitting for a person whose current addiction level is





















39~ ¢H is weakly decreasing in k, is increasing in ´,a n d¢H = ~ ¢H(0;1).
De…ne rt
¿ ´f (at;a t+1;:::;aT) 2A t j at0 =1if and only if t0 ¸ ¿g. In words, rt
¿ is the period-t
behavior path that involves refraining until period ¿ and then hitting thereafter.
Suppose ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H. Because this implies h(0) ¸ 0, ®s(k;T)=1for all k ¸ 0 —t h ep e r s o n
hits no matter what in period T.G i v e nt h i s ,®s(k;T ¡1) = 1 if and only if hT¡1(k) ¸ ¯±~ ¢H(k;1).
Given hT¡1(k) ¸ ¹ xo for all k and ~ ¢H(k;1) · ¢H for all k, ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H implies ®s(k;T ¡1) = 1 for
all k ¸ 0 — the person hits no matter what in period T¡1. Iterating this logic, it is straightforward
to derive that for any T<1, ®s(k;t)=1for all k and t, in which case the corresponding in…nite-
horizon strategy involves ®s(k;t)=1for all k and t.
Suppose ¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H.N o wt h e r ee x i s t s¹ ´ 2f 0;1;:::g such that ¹ xo <¯ ±~ ¢H(0;´) if and only if
´ ¸ ¹ ´. The logic above implies that for all t>T¡ ¹ ´, ®s(k;t)=1for all k, and that for ¹ ¿ ´ T ¡ ¹ ´
there exists k0 > 0 such that ®s(k;¹ ¿)=0if and only if k<k 0. It is straightforward (although
tedious) to derive that for any t<¹ ¿ and k<k 0, a sophisticate’s desired behavior conditional on
hitting from period ¹ ¿ +1onward — that is, among the set of strategies At
¤ ´
f(at;:::aT) 2A t j a¿ =1for t>¹ ¿g —i srt
¹ ¿+1. Hence, in period ¹ ¿ ¡ 1, a sophisticate with
k¹ ¿¡1 <k 0 perceives that refraining now will lead to following his desired behavior path r¹ ¿¡1
¹ ¿+1,
and so ®s(k;¹ ¿ ¡ 1) = 0 for all k<k 0. But this means that in period ¹ ¿ ¡ 2 a sophisticate with
k¹ ¿¡2 <k 0 perceives that refraining now will lead to following his desired behavior path r¹ ¿¡2
¹ ¿+1,a n d
so ®s(k;¹ ¿ ¡ 2) = 0 for all k<k 0. Iterating this logic, it follows that for all t · ¹ ¿, ®s(k;t)=0for
all k<k 0, in which case the corresponding in…nite-horizon strategy involves for all t, ®s(k;t)=0
for all k<k 0.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :The value kN;A(¯) is the k such that
(1¡±+¯±)¹ xo











and the value kN;1(¯) is the k such that








(1) For all k and t, TCs follow their desired behavior path, which is either hit always or refrain
always. Clearly ®tc(k;t)=1i fa n do n l yi ft h e i rd e s i r e db e h a v i o rp a t hi sh i ta l w a y s ,w h i c hm e a n s
k ¸ kN;A(1).
(2) For all k and t, naifs attempt to follow their desired behavior path, which is either hit always,
hit once, or refrain always. Hence, ®n(k;t)=1if and only if their desired behavior path is either
hit always or hit once, which means k ¸ minfkN;A(¯);kN;1(¯)g.
(3) That ®s(k;t)=1for all k if ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H follows from Lemma 4. Suppose ¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H.
De…ne k¤¤ such that sophisticates’ desired behavior path is hit always for all k ¸ k¤¤,i nw h i c hc a s e
40clearly ®s(k;t)=1if k ¸ k¤¤. Consider k 2 [(k¤¤ ¡ 1)=°;k¤¤).B e c a u s e°k +1¸ k¤¤, hitting with
addition level k will lead a sophisticate to hit always. The best possible behavior path following
restraint is never hitting (given that k<k ¤¤). Hence, for any k 2 [(k¤¤ ¡ 1)=°;k¤¤) such that
k ¸ kN;A(¯), which means hitting always is preferred to never hitting, ®s(k;t)=1 .B e c a u s e w e
can iterate this logic, it follows that for any t, ®s(k;t)=1if k ¸ kN;A(¯).
By Lemma 4, there exists k0 > 0 such that for all t, ®s(k;t)=0if k<k 0.C o n s i d e rk 2 [k0;k0=°).
Because °k < k0, refraining with addiction level k implies never hitting. Hence, for any k 2 [k0;k0=°)
such that k<minfkN;A(¯);kN;1(¯)g, which means never hitting is sophisticates’ desired behavior
path, ®s(k;t)=0 . Because we can iterate this logic, it follows that for any t, ®s(k;t)=0if
k<minfkN;A(¯);kN;1(¯)g.
Suppose °kN;1(¯)+1¸ kN;A(¯). In this case, one possibility is kN;1(¯) ¸ kN;A(¯),i nw h i c h
case it follows from above that ®s(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ kN;A(¯). The other possibility is
kN;1(¯) <k N;A(¯). But then for any k 2 [kN;1(¯);kN;A(¯)), hitting with addiction level k implies
hitting always (because °k +1¸ kN;A(¯)), and an iteration logic similar to that in the previous
paragraph yields ®s(k;t)=1if and only if k ¸ kN;A(¯).
Finally suppose °kN;1(¯)+1<k N;A(¯), which implies kN;1(¯) <k N;A(¯). In this case, our
results above imply ®s(k;t)=0if k<k N;1(¯) and ®s(k;t)=1if k ¸ kN;A(¯).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :(1) ®tc(k;t) · ®n(k;t) for all k and t is established by Lemma 1; and
®n(k;t) · ®s(k;t) for all k and t follows trivially from Lemma 4, which establishes that ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H
implies ®s(k;t)=1for all k and t.
(2) ®s(k;t) · ®n(k;t) follows from Lemma 5, which establishes that ®n(k;t)=1if k ¸
minfkN;A(¯);kN;1(¯)g whereas ®s(k;t)=1only if k ¸ minfkN;A(¯);kN;1(¯)g. ®tc(k;t) · ®s(k;t)
also follows from Lemma 5, which establishes ®s(k;t)=1if k ¸ kN;A(¯) whereas ®tc(k;t)=1only
if k ¸ kN;A(1) ¸ kN;A(¯).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :De…ne ¹ k such that















is weakly decreasing in k (since g is weakly convex), there exists
a unique such ¹ k, and moreover f(k) ¡ g(k) <¯ ±
£
¢R (k) ¡ ¢H¤
for k<¹ k and f(k) ¡ g(k) >
¯±
£
¢R (k) ¡ ¢H¤




from Lemma 2), ¹ k>0. Because ± =1implies ¯±
£
¢R(kmax) ¡ ¢H¤




is increasing in ± (whenever it’s positive), ¹ k<k max.
41(1) Suppose k1 · ¹ k. By Lemma 5, naifs hit always only if ¹ xo such that k1 ¸ minfkN;A(¯);kN;1(¯)g.
If k1 ¸ kN;A(¯), then sophisticates hit always. If k1 ¸ kN;1(¯),t h e n¹ xo+f(k1)¡g(k1) ¸ ¯±¢R(k1).
But since k1 · ¹ k implies f(k1)¡g(k1) · ¯±¢R(k1)¡¯±¢H, k1 ¸ kN;1(¯) implies ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H and
therefore sophisticates hit always. The result follows.
(2) Suppose k1 ¸ ¹ k. By Lemma 5, naifs never hit only if ¹ xo such that k1 < minfkN;A(¯);kN;1(¯)g,
which requires k1 <k N;1(¯).I fk1 <k N;1(¯) then ¹ xo+f(k1)¡g(k1) <¯ ± ¢R(k1).A n ds i n c ek1 ¸ ¹ k
implies f(k1)¡g(k1) ¸ ¯±¢R(k1)¡¯±¢H, k1 <k N;1(¯) implies ¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H and therefore sophis-
ticates refrain whenever naifs refrain. The result follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :It is clear that both behavior and welfare losses depend only on ¹ xo ´
xo ¡ yo and not on the speci…c values of xo and yo. For notational simplicity, therefore, the
proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 shall assume yo =0and xo =¹ xo. De…ne V N(¹ xo;k 1), V A(¹ xo;k 1),
and V 1(¹ xo;k 1) to be the long-run utilities from never hitting, hitting always, and hitting once,
respectively. Similarly, de…ne ~ V N(¹ xo;k 1), ~ V A(¹ xo;k 1),a n d~ V 1(¹ xo;k 1) to be the short-run utilities
from these behavior paths. Given f(k)=¡½k, g(k)=¡Á½k,a n d¢H =
½
1¡±°, it is straightforward
to derive:
V N(¹ xo;k 1)=¡Á¢Hk1 and ~ V N(¹ xo;k 1)=¡Á½k1 ¡ ¯±Á¢H°k1
V A(¹ xo;k 1)= ¹ xo
1¡± ¡ ±¢H





V 1(¹ xo;k 1)=¹ xo ¡ ½k1 ¡ ±Á¢H(°k1 +1 )and ~ V 1(¹ xo;k 1)=¹ xo ¡ ½k1 ¡ ¯±Á¢H(°k1 +1 ) .
(1) TCs either never hit or hit always; committers either never hit, hit always, or hit once.
Committers su¤er welfare losses only if they hit always or hit once when TCs never hit. Because
@V A
@¹ xo > @V 1
@¹ xo > @V N
@¹ xo , welfare losses are maximized at either the minimum ¹ xo such that committers
hit always or the minimum ¹ xo such that committers hit once.
De…ne xN;1 such that ~ V N(xN;1;0) = ~ V 1(xN;1;0), de…ne xN;A such that
~ V N(xN;A;0) = ~ V A(xN;A;0), and de…ne x1;A such that
~ V 1(x1;A;0) = ~ V A(x1;A;0). Algebra reveals xN;A =
¯±¢H
1¡±+¯± and xN;1 = ¯±Á¢H, and therefore
xN;1 · xN;A if and only if Á · 1
1¡±+¯±.
Suppose Á · 1
1¡±+¯±.B e c a u s e@ ~ V A
@¹ xo > @ ~ V 1
@¹ xo > @ ~ V N
@¹ xo , it follows that x1;A ¸ xN;1, and therefore
committers never hit for ¹ xo <x N;1,h i to n c ef o r¹ xo 2 [xN;1;x 1;A),a n dh i ta l w a y sf o r¹ xo ¸ x1;A.
Hence, if Á · 1
1¡±+¯± welfare losses are maximized at xN;1 (because x1;A is the ¹ xo at which





V N(xN;1;0) ¡ V 1(xN;1;0) = ±(1 ¡ ¯)Á¢H.
If Á ¸ 1
1¡±+¯± then xN;1 ¸ xN;A,i nw h i c hc a s e@ ~ V A
@¹ xo > @ ~ V 1
@¹ xo > @ ~ V N
@¹ xo implies that committers
never hit for ¹ xo <x N;A and hit always for ¹ xo ¸ xN;A. Hence, if Á ¸ 1
1¡±+¯± then welfare losses are




= V N(xN;A;0)¡V A(xN;A;0) =
±(1¡¯)
1¡±+¯±¢H.
(2) TCs and sophisticates both either never hit or hit always, and so sophisticates su¤er welfare
losses only if they hit always when TCs never hit. Because @V A
@¹ xo > @V N
@¹ xo , welfare losses are maximized
at the minimum ¹ xo such that sophisticates hit always. Lemma 4 implies sophisticates hit always
if and only if ¹ xo ¸ ¯±¢H. Hence, for any Á>1 welfare losses are maximized at ¹ xo = ¯±¢H,a n d
so max¹ xo2I R [WL(0;® s)] = V N(¯±¢H;0) ¡ V A(¯±¢H;0) =
±(1¡¯)
1¡± ¢H.
(3) Like sophisticates, naifs su¤er welfare losses only if they hit always when TCs never hit, and
so welfare losses are maximized at the minimum ¹ xo such that naifs hit always. Using the notation
from the proof of part 1, naifs hit always if ¹ xo ¸ minfxN;A;x N;1g.
As above, if Á · 1
1¡±+¯± then xN;1 · xN;A, and therefore welfare losses are maximized at xN;1.
Hence, max¹ xo2I R [WL(0;® n)] = V N(xN;1;0) ¡ V A(xN;1;0) =
±(1¡¯Á)
1¡± ¢H.
If Á ¸ 1
1¡±+¯± then xN;1 ¸ xN;A, and therefore welfare losses are maximized at xN;A. Hence,
max¹ xo2I R [WL(0;® n)] = V N(xN;A;0) ¡ V A(xN;A;0) =
±(1¡¯)
1¡±+¯±¢H.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :(1) For any k1, committers su¤er welfare losses only if they hit always
or hit once when TCs never hit, and welfare losses are maximized at either the minimum ¹ xo such
that committers hit always or the minimum ¹ xo such that committers hit once.
De…ne xN;1 such that ~ V N(xN;1;k 1)=~ V 1(xN;1;k 1),d e … n exN;A such that
~ V N(xN;A;k 1)=~ V A(xN;A;k 1), and de…ne x1;A such that




1¡±+¯± (Á ¡ 1)¢Hk1 and
xN;1 = ¯±Á¢H¡(1¡±°)(Á¡1)¢Hk1, and therefore xN;1 · xN;A if and only if k1 ¸
(1¡±+¯±)Á¡1
Á¡1 kmax ´
k¤ (recall that kmax = 1
1¡°). Note that Á> 1
1¡±+¯± implies k¤ 2 (0;kmax).
Suppose k1 ¸ k¤.B e c a u s e @ ~ V A
@¹ xo > @ ~ V 1
@¹ xo > @ ~ V N
@¹ xo , it follows that x1;A ¸ xN;1, and therefore
committers never hit for ¹ xo <x N;1,h i to n c ef o r¹ xo 2 [xN;1;x 1;A),a n dh i ta l w a y sf o r¹ xo ¸ x1;A.





V N(xN;1;k 1) ¡ V 1(xN;1;k 1)=±(1 ¡ ¯)Á¢H.
If k1 · k¤ then xN;1 ¸ xN;A,i nw h i c hc a s e@ ~ V A
@¹ xo > @ ~ V 1
@¹ xo > @ ~ V N
@¹ xo implies that committers
never hit for ¹ xo <x N;A and hit always for ¹ xo ¸ xN;A.H e n c e , i f k1 · k¤ then welfare losses











(2) Naifs su¤er welfare losses only if they hit always when TCs never hit, and so welfare losses
are maximized at the minimum ¹ xo such that naifs hit always. Using the notation from the proof
of part 1, naifs hit always if ¹ xo ¸ minfxN;A;x N;1g.
As above, if k1 ¸ k¤ then xN;1 · xN;A, and therefore welfare losses are maximized at xN;1.








If k1 · k¤ then xN;1 ¸ xN;A, and therefore welfare losses are maximized at xN;A. Hence,







P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :(1) We …rst prove that for any behavior paths a ´ (a1;a 2;:::) and a0 ´
(a0
1;a 0
2;:::) with an ¸ a0
n for all n, Vt(k;a) ¡ Vt(k;a0) ¸ V¿(k;a) ¡ V¿(k;a0) for any t<¿.G i v e nf
and g are independent of t, [Vt(k;a) ¡ Vt(k;a0)] ¡ [V¿(k;a) ¡ V¿(k;a0)] =
P1
n=1 ±n¡1I(an >a 0
n)[(xt+n ¡ yt+n) ¡ (x¿+n ¡ y¿+n)],w h e r eI is an indicator function as in the
proof of Lemma 2. Given youthful instantaneous utilities, t<¿implies xt+n¡yt+n ¸ x¿+n¡y¿+n
for all n, and the result follows.
Suppose that ¹ ktc
t · ¹ ktc
t+1 for all t ¸ ¿.L e t t i n g ~ a be the optimal behavior path for a person
in period ¿ with addiction level k¿ = ¹ ktc
¿ , which must involve hitting in period ¿, and de…ning
r ´ (0;0;:::),w em u s th a v eV¿(¹ ktc
¿ ;~ a) ¸ V¿(¹ ktc
¿ ;r). Now consider a person in period ¿ ¡ 1 with
addiction level k¿¡1 = ¹ ktc
¿ . Given the premise that ¹ ktc
t · ¹ ktc
t+1 for all t ¸ ¿,i ft h i sp e r s o n
refrains then he will refrain forever after. Given our assumption that people hit when indi¤erent,
this person can therefore refrain only if V¿¡1(¹ ktc
¿ ;r) >V ¿¡1(¹ ktc
¿ ;a) for all a 2f 0;1g1,a n di n
particular only if V¿¡1(¹ ktc
¿ ;r) >V ¿¡1(¹ ktc
¿ ;~ a). But our result in the previous paragraph implies
that if V¿(¹ ktc
¿ ;~ a) ¸ V¿(¹ ktc
¿ ;r) then V¿¡1(¹ ktc
¿ ;~ a) ¸ V¿¡1(¹ ktc
¿ ;r). Hence, this person must hit, and
therefore ¹ ktc
¿¡1 · ¹ ktc
¿ .
We have thus established that if ¹ ktc
t · ¹ ktc
t+1 for all t ¸ ¿,t h e n¹ ktc
t · ¹ ktc
t+1 for all t ¸ ¿ ¡ 1.
Lemma 3 implies that ¹ ktc
t = ¹ ktc
t+1 for all t ¸ M, and the result follows.
(2) The proof is almost identical to that for TCs, and so is omitted.
(3) Note that if for all t>¿® s(k;t)=1for all k,t h e nU¿+1 (°k;®s) ¡ U¿+1 (°k+1 ;® s)=
~ ¢H(k;1), where ~ ¢H is de…ned in the proof of Lemma 4 and is independent of ¿. By Lemma 4,
¹ xM ¸ ¯±¢H implies that for all t ¸ M® s(k;t)=1for all k, which in turn requires hM(k) ¸
¯±~ ¢H(k;1) for all k.T h e nhM¡1(k) ¸ hM(k) for all k implies hM¡1(k) ¸ ¯±~ ¢H(k;1) for all k,
and therefore ®s(k;M ¡ 1) = 1 for all k. Iterating this logic, it follows that ®s(k;t)=1for all k
and t.
That ¹ xM <¯ ± ¢H implies there exists k0 > 0 such that for all t ¸ M® s(k;t)=0for all k<k 0
follows directly from Lemma 4.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :(1) ®n(k;t) · ®s(k;t) for all k and t follows trivially from Lemma 6,
44which establishes that ¹ xM ¸ ¯±¢H implies ®s(k;t)=1for all k and t.
( 2 )W e… r s te s t a b l i s ht h a ti ff o ra l lt>¿® s(k;t) · ®n(k;t) for all k,t h e n®s(k;¿) · ®n(k;¿)
for all k.I f ®n(k;¿)=1 ,t h e nc l e a r l y®s(k;¿) · ®n(k;¿). Suppose instead that ®n(k;¿)=0 ,







°k +1 ;® tc¢¤
. By Lemma 6, if naifs refrain in
period ¿ then they will refrain forever after, which implies that if TCs refrain in period ¿ then
they will refrain forever after. Moreover, the premise that for all t>¿® s(k;t) · ®n(k;t) for
all k implies that if sophisticates refrain in period ¿ then they will refrain forever after, and so
U¿+1(°k;®s)=U¿+1(°k;®tc). By revealed preference for TCs, U¿+1(°k+1;® tc) ¸ U¿+1(°k+1;® s),









h¿(k) and therefore ®s(k;¿)=0 . The claim follows.
The result then follows from Proposition 1, which implies that if ¹ xM <¯ ± ¢H then ®s(k;t) ·
®n(k;t) for all k and t ¸ M.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :Let w(a) and ^ w(a) be the person’s period-1 utility before and after the
youthful rotation, respectively, from following behavior path a given initial addiction level k1 =0 .
Let r ´ (0;0;:::), h ´ (1;1;:::),a n dh1 ´ (1;0;0;:::). The de…nition of a youthful rotation implies
w(h)=^ w(h), w(r)= ^ w(r),a n dw(h1) · ^ w(h1).
(1) Lemma 5 implies an = h only if minfw(h);w(h1)g¸w(r), and since minf^ w(h); ^ w(h1)g¸
minfw(h);w(h1)g¸w(r)=^ w(r), it follows that b an 6= r.
(2) as = r implies w(r) >w (h) by Lemma 5. as = r also implies that ¹ xo <¯ ± ¢H by Lemma 4,
and the de…nition of a youthful rotation then implies ¹ xM <¯ ± ¢H.I fM =2 , refraining in period
1w i l ll e a dt ob e h a v i o rp a t hr,a n ds ob as = h only if ^ w(h) ¸ ^ w(r), which does not hold. For M>2,
as = r implies an = r by Proposition 2, and given as = r also implies ¹ xM <¯ ± ¢H, Proposition 5
implies that if in addition b as = h then b an = h.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :A sf o rP r o p o s i t i o n s3a n d4 ,b o t hb e h a v i o ra n dw e l f a r el o s s e sd e p e n d
only on ¹ xt ´ xt¡yt and not on the speci…c values of xt and yt. For notational simplicity, therefore,
this proof shall assume yt =0and xt =¹ xt for all t.
(1) Because committers behave optimally from period 2 onward, committers su¤er welfare
losses only if they hit in period 1 while TCs never hit. Moreover, if committers hit in period 1,
then their period-2 continuation utility is U2(1;® tc). Hence, committers hit in period 1 only if
¹ x1 + ¯±U2(1;® tc) ¸ 0, and their welfare loss from doing so is ¡¹ x1 ¡ ±U2(1;® tc). Because a TC in
period 2 with addiction level k2 =1could choose to refrain forever after, which yields continuation
utility ¡Á¢H, by revealed preference U2(1;® tc) ¸¡ Á¢H.B e c a u s e ¹ x1 + ¯±U2(1;® tc) ¸ 0 and
45U2(1;® tc) ¸¡ Á¢H imply ¡¹ x1 ¡ ±U2(1;® tc) · ±(1 ¡ ¯)Á¢H, we can conclude




· ±(1 ¡ ¯)Á¢H.
It remains to prove we can hit this bound for any Á.T od os o ,s i m p l yl e t¹ x1 = ¯±Á¢H and let
¹ xt be su¢ciently small for all t ¸ 2 that ®tc(k;t)=0for all k and t ¸ 2 (recall ¹ xt can be negative).
¹ x1 = ¯±Á¢H <± Á ¢H implies committers hit once and TCs never hit, and committers therefore
su¤er a welfare loss of ¡¹ x1 + ±Á¢H = ±(1 ¡ ¯)Á¢H.
(2) Choose (¹ x1; ¹ x2;:::) such that ¹ x1 = ¯±Á¢H, ¹ x2 + ¾ = ¯±Á¢H, ¹ x3 + ¾(1 + °)=¯±Á¢H,
and so forth. ¹ x1 = ¯±Á¢H implies a naif in period 1 with k1 =0just prefers hitting once to
never hitting, and ¹ x2 + ¾ = ¯±Á¢H implies a naif in period 2 with k2 =1just prefers hitting
once to never hitting, and ¹ x3 + ¾(1 + °)=¯±Á¢H implies a naif in period 3 with k3 =1+°
just prefers hitting once to never hitting, and so forth. Hence, with this (¹ x1; ¹ x2;:::) naifs hit
always while TCs never hit, and so naifs su¤er a welfare loss of ¡
P1
t=1 ±t¡1¹ xt + ±¢H
1¡± .I t i s
straightforward to derive
P1




1¡± , and hence naifs su¤er welfare loss
¡
P1




The (¹ x1; ¹ x2;:::) chosen above minimize
P1
t=1 ±t¡1¹ xt subject to naifs planning every period to
hit once. The welfare losses cannot be larger because if in some period ¿ naifs plan to hit m>1
times, then the ¹ x0
t for periods ¿ +1through ¿ + m must be su¢ciently large that TCs would hit,
which would clearly mean smaller welfare losses.






. By revealed preference, if he hits some during the traumatic











(2) Vt(k;r) is the long-run continuation utility from refraining forever after. We know that
®s(0;t)=0for all t ¸ N +1 .I f ®s(0;N)=0 ,t h e nUN(0;® s)=VN(0;r).I f ®s(0;N)=1 ,
then 0+¯±UN+1(1;® s) ¸¡ yN + ¯±VN+1(0;r).B u t s i n c e ®s(0;N)=1implies UN(0;® s)=
0+±UN+1(1;® s),a n ds i n c e¡yN + ¯±VN+1(0;r)=¡(1 ¡ ¯)yN + ¯VN(0;r), it follows that if
®s(0;N)=1then UN(0;® s) ¸ VN(0;r) ¡
1¡¯
¯ yN. Hence, whether ®s(0;N)=0or ®s(0;N)=1 ,
we have UN(0;® s) ¸ VN(0;r) ¡
1¡¯
¯ yN.
Consider period N ¡ 1.I f ®s(0;N ¡ 1) = 0,t h e nUN¡1(0;® s)=¡yN¡1 + ±UN(0;® s) ¸
VN¡1(0;r) ¡
1¡¯
¯ ±yN.I f ®s(0;N ¡ 1) = 1,t h e n0+¯±UN(1;® s)=¯UN¡1(0;® s) ¸¡ yN¡1 +






, which yields UN¡1(0;® s) ¸ VN¡1(0;r)¡
1¡¯
¯ (yN¡1+
±yN). Hence, whether ®s(0;N¡ 1) = 0 or ®s(0;N¡ 1) = 1,w eh a v eUN¡1(0;® s) ¸ VN¡1(0;r) ¡
1¡¯
¯ (yN¡1 + ±yN).



















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 :(1) For any p ´ (p1;p 2;:::),d e … n ek¤
1(p) to be the period-1 addiction
level such that a TC is indi¤erent between hitting always and never hitting. k¤























which we can rewrite as
P1
t=1 ±t¡1(¡pt)+© ( k¤














. It is straightforward to show that ©0(k) < 0.
De…ne ¹ p ´ (¹ p; ¹ p;:::). Applying Lemma 5, ¹ ktc
t = k¤
1(¹ p) for all t. A simple application of the
implicit function theorem yields d¹ ktc
1 =d¹ p =( 1 =(1 ¡ ±))=[¡©0 (k¤
1(¹ p))].
Consider next an immediate temporary price change. Given pt =¹ p for all t ¸ 2, ¹ ktc
t = k¤
1(¹ p)
for all t ¸ 2, which implies that for any k1 2 [(k¤
1(¹ p) ¡ 1)=°;k¤
1(¹ p)=°] the person compares hitting
always to never hitting. Hence, for p1 su¢ciently close to ¹ p that ¹ ktc
1 2 [(k¤
1(¹ p) ¡ 1)=°;k¤
1(¹ p)=°], ¹ ktc
1 is
determined by the condition
P1
t=1 ±t¡1(¡pt)+©(k¤
1(p)) = 0.A tp1 =¹ p, d¹ ktc
1 =dp1 =1 =[¡©0 (k¤
1(¹ p))].
Consider a temporary price change in period ¿. The logic above implies that at p¿ =¹ p,
d¹ ktc
¿ =dp¿ =1 =[¡©0 (k¤
1(¹ p))]. Moreover, for p¿ su¢ciently close to ¹ p that ¹ ktc
¿ 2 [°k¤
1(¹ p);°k¤
1(¹ p)+1 ] ,
¹ ktc
¿¡1 is determined by the condition
P1
n=0 ±n(¡p¿¡1+n)+© ( k¤
1(p)) = 0 and therefore at p¿ =¹ p,
d¹ ktc
¿¡1=dp¿ = ±=[¡©0 (k¤
1(¹ p))]. Iterating this logic, we conclude that ¹ ktc
1 is determined by the
condition
P1
t=1 ±t¡1(¡pt)+© ( k¤
1(p)) = 0,a n dt h e r e f o r ea tp¿ =¹ p, d¹ ktc
1 =dp¿ = ±¿¡1=[¡©0 (k¤
1(¹ p))].




1 =d¹ p)=(d¹ ktc
1 =dp1)=1 =(1 ¡ ±):
(2a) For any p ´ (p1;p 2;:::), de…ne k
¯
1(p) to be the period-1 addiction level such that a naif is
indi¤erent between hitting always and never hitting. k
¯
1(p) is de…ned by
h























































. It is straightforward to show that ~ ©0(k) < 0.
Applying Lemma 5, if kN;A(¯; ¹ p) <k N;1(¯; ¹ p) then ¹ kn
t = k
¯
1(¹ p) for all t. It is straightforward to
show that for small price changes ¹ kn
1 is still the addiction level at which the person is indi¤erent
between hitting always and never hitting (the logic is the same as that used in the proof of
part 1). Applying the implicit function theorem yields d¹ kn
























]. The result follows.
(2b) For any p ´ (p1;p 2;:::),d e … n e~ k
¯
1(p) to be the period-1 addiction level such that a naif is
indi¤erent between hitting once and never hitting. ~ k
¯
1(p) is de…ned by
h































which we can rewrite as p1 + ~ ¡(k
¯











. It is straightforward to show that ~ ¡0(k) < 0.
Applying Lemma 5, if kN;1(¯;¹ p) <k N;A(¯; ¹ p) then ¹ kn
t = ~ k
¯
1(¹ p) for all t. It is again straight-
forward to show that for small price changes ¹ kn
1 is still the addiction level at which the person is
indi¤erent between hitting once and never hitting. Applying the implicit function theorem yields
d¹ kn













],a n dd¹ kn
1=dp¿ =0 . The result follows.
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